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altered the trajectory of American corporate governance.  When a 
hostile takeover wave seemed imminent in Japan in the mid-2000s, 
Japanese boards appeared to embrace this American invention with 
equal enthusiasm.  Japan’s experience should have been a ringing 
endorsement for the utility of American corporate governance 
solutions in foreign jurisdictions—but it was not to be.  Japan’s 
unique interpretation of the “poison pill” that was so eagerly 
adopted by Japanese companies in the mid-to-late 2000s has turned 
out to be nothing like their potent American namesakes—and, in 
fact, the opposite of what would be expected by leading U.S. 
academics who have built a cottage industry publishing on the U.S. 
poison pill. 
Based on hand collected empirical data, we provide the first in-
depth analysis of why Japan’s “poison pill” (defensive measures) is 
heading towards extinction—a watershed reversal that is 
unexplained in the Japanese literature and has almost entirely 
escaped the English language literature.  By drawing on our hand-
collected data, case studies, and Japanese jurisprudence, we 
illuminate the unique and untold story of how one of the most 
discussed mechanisms of corporate governance in the U.S. has 
worked almost entirely differently when transplanted to Japanese 
soil—the importance of which is heightened as Japan is by far the 
largest economy in which the poison pill has been tested outside of 
the United States.  Additionally, our analysis sheds light on the 
unexpected importance of Japan’s recently implemented corporate 
governance code and stewardship code—two Western legal 
transplants that have garnered considerable attention in the English 
language literature, but which have yet to be evaluated in light of 
their impact on defensive measures in Japan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the “shareholder rights’ plan”, more popularly 
known as the “poison pill”1, fundamentally altered the trajectory of 
American corporate governance.  Intended to defend vulnerable 
boards from corporate raiders, the poison pill was embraced by U.S. 
managers in the 1980s as a lifeline in a sea of hostile takeovers.2  
When pundits predicted an imminent wave of hostile takeovers in 
Japan in the mid-2000s,3 Japanese boards appeared to embrace the 
American invention of the poison pill with equal enthusiasm.4 
Japan’s experience should have been a ringing endorsement for 
the utility of American corporate governance solutions in foreign 
jurisdictions and served as evidence supporting the view that 
corporate governance around the world is destined to converge on 
the American model.5  That is, but for two “inconvenient truths” that 
foreign observers and corporate law scholars have overlooked.  
These inconvenient truths not only make what occurred in Japan 
entirely different from what occurred in the United States, but also 
offer novel insights into how defensive measures have evolved in an 
unpredictable way in the world’s third largest economy. 
The first inconvenient truth, which two of the authors previously 
explored, is that Japan’s “poison pill” is fundamentally different 
from the U.S.-style poison pill.6  The second inconvenient truth—
which this Article exposes—is that the “poison pills” that were the 
darling of Japanese companies in the mid-2000s have, since their 
brief moment in the sun, gone into sustained decline in the most 
 
 1 See Frank Allen & Steve Swartz, Lenox Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense, 
WALL STREET J., June. 16, 1983, at 2 (providing the first known use of the term 
“poison pill”). 
 2 See infra Part 1. 
 3 See Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile 
Takeovers in Japan: Bidder Beware, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 4, 13-15 (2018) (mentioning 
several predictions around a possible wave of hostile takeovers in Japan in the mid-
2000s and explaining how some idiosyncratic Japanese factors could account for the 
unfulfilled predictions).  
 4 See infra Section 4.1. 
 5 Compare Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40, 468 (2001) (declaring that convergence 
toward a standard, shareholder-centric model—that has always been dominant in 
the United States—had occurred) with Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of 
American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History for Corporate 
Law, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 9-10 (2007) (rejecting the convergence debate as 
irrelevant because corporate governance systems always evolve). 
 6 See generally Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3. 
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striking reversal of its kind outside of the U.S. and appear to be 
heading towards extinction. 
This Article reveals empirical evidence showing that two trends 
have fundamentally reshaped the so-called “poison pill” in Japan.  
First, after an initial boom from 2005–2008, during which hundreds 
of Japanese companies adopted “pills” each year, new adoptions of 
the “pill” fell precipitously.  In 2008, which was the last year of the 
boom, listed companies in Japan adopted 207 “pills”.  The next year, 
in 2009, merely 21 “pills” were adopted.  In 2010, a paltry 4 “pills” 
were adopted, and every year since then the number of companies 
adopting “pills” has remained in the single digits.7  The obvious 
puzzle is: what happened in 2008 to cause listed companies in Japan 
to virtually cease adopting new “pills”, and what has sustained this 
“new normal” over the past decade? 
Second, in 2013–2014, the rate at which companies in Japan that 
had previously adopted a “pill” and then later decided to remove it 
spiked.  Interestingly, almost all these removals took place because 
management decided not to seek shareholder approval to renew an 
existing “pill” (which is normally required every three-years 
according to the terms of Japanese “pills”).8  In 2013, merely 3.61% 
of listed companies did not renew their “pills”, compared with 
22.60% in 2018.  Our hand collected data reveals that the non-
renewal rate increased significantly around 2013–2014 and has been 
rising ever since.9  The obvious puzzle is: why did the rate of non-
renewals spike around 2013–2014, and why has it continued to rise 
ever since? 
The combined effect of the collapse of new “pill” adoptions after 
2008, with the spike in non-renewals after 2013, is that the total 
number of listed companies with “pills” in Japan has been rapidly 
falling.  Based on our hand collected data, in 2016–2017, for every 
firm that adopted a new “pill”, sixteen failed to renew existing 
ones.10  This has placed the “pill” in Japan on a trajectory towards 
extinction—transforming Japan into the “land of the falling ‘poison 
pill’”. 
This Article seeks to solve these puzzles by providing what is, to 
our knowledge, the first in-depth analysis in the comparative 
corporate governance literature of Japan’s surprising reversal on the 
 
 7 See infra Table 2, Fig. 2. 
 8 See discussion infra Section 4.1; infra notes 179-181; Table 3, Fig. 2. 
 9 See infra Table 2, Fig. 2. 
 10 See infra Section 4.1. 
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“poison pill” by drawing on Japanese sources that were before now 
unexplored in the English-language literature.  The reasons behind 
the watershed reversal in the adoption of the so-called “poison pill” 
by Japanese companies, to our knowledge, have also not been 
explored in either English or Japanese.  This gap in the comparative 
corporate governance literature is glaring as it is the largest reversal 
of its kind outside of the U.S. and involves a mechanism that has 
produced a small cottage industry of academic musings in the 
leading U.S. literature.11 
Specifically, we offer three explanations for the decline of 
Japan’s “poison pill” supported by empirical data, case studies, 
Japanese jurisprudence, and an in-depth review of Japanese 
academic literature and financial industry reports.  First, the fact that 
the prophesied tsunami of hostile bids in the mid-2000s failed to 
produce even a single successful hostile takeover, combined with a 
dearth in hostile acquirers following the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis, reduced the threat of hostile takeovers that was an impetus 
for Japanese managers to adopt the “pill” in the pre-2008 boom 
years.12 
Second, the so-called “poison pill” in Japan is a far cry from the 
potent poison that many thought it would be when the government 
approved its use in 2005—which, at that time, appeared to have been 
created “in the shadow of Delaware”.13  Over the past decade it has 
become increasingly clear that the so-called “pill” in Japan lacks the 
active ingredient of its American namesake: providing the board—
without shareholder approval—a veto right over a hostile bid.14  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that almost all so-called Japanese 
“pills” require some form of shareholder approval, which makes 
 
 11 For a sampling of frequently-cited articles focusing on or devoting 
substantial attention to the poison pill, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1936-48 (1991); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Just Say Never—Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: 
An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There 
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989); Michael Klausner, Fact 
and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-1352 (2013); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 491 (2001); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 381 (2002). 
 12 See infra Section 4.2. 
 13 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers 
in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2196-96 n.82 (2005) (describing the process by 
which Delaware takeover jurisprudence was adopted). 
 14 See infra Section 2.2. 
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sense considering they have been designed in the shadow of 
ambiguous Japanese (not Delaware) jurisprudence.  This scant and 
ambiguous jurisprudence has not established that boards—without 
shareholder approval—can adopt, maintain or even trigger a “pill” 
in Japan.15  We query whether a “pill” that requires shareholder 
approval should even be called a “pill”—a point discussed in detail 
below.  Here, the crucial point is that, as it has become increasingly 
clear that Japanese “pills” fail to provide the board with an 
unambiguous veto—without shareholder approval—over a hostile 
bid, the incentive for management to adopt them has significantly 
diminished. 
Third, more recent changes to Japan’s corporate governance 
environment have provided the impetus for increased institutional 
investor resistance to the introduction of new “pills” and, more 
importantly, for approving the renewal of expiring ones.  In 2015, 
Japan adopted a “comply or explain” Corporate Governance Code 
with an idiosyncratic provision: the requirement that companies 
comply with having no “poison pill” or explain why they have 
one16—a particularly challenging task in the only major developed 
economy that has yet to experience a successful hostile takeover.  
Then, in 2017, Japan amended its Stewardship Code to, among other 
things, require institutional investors to disclose their votes on 
individual agenda items.17 Again, in an economy with no successful 
hostile takeovers, for an institutional investor to disclose their 
support for renewal of existing “poison pills” would call for an 
explanation.  The timing appears to be significant: shortly before 
Japan’s revised Stewardship Code went into effect, the ratio of 
removals/adoptions of the so-called “poison pill” increased 
markedly, making this the most devastating blow yet to the “pill” in 
Japan and corresponding to institutional investors voluntarily 
disclosing their votes to prepare for the inauguration of the 
Stewardship Code.  This timely fall in the “poison pill” is highly 
interesting, as it suggests that Japan’s Stewardship Code 
amendment may have prevented institutional investors from 
continuing to act in support of management.  This is a tangible 
 
 15 See infra Section 2.3. 
 16 See infra notes 201-202; Japan’s Corporate Governance Code [Final 
Proposal] Seeking Sustainable Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value 
over the Mid-to Long-Term, The Council of Experts Concerning the Corporate 
Governance Code (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/
corporategovernance/20150306-1/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2VL-DYZN].  
 17 See infra note 206. 
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impact on corporate governance not previously foreseen or 
contemplated by the growing international stewardship literature.18 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part 1 begins by providing the 
comparative legal context by explaining the Anglo-American 
approach to takeover regulation, including the U.S.-style poison pill 
and United Kingdom (“U.K.”) regulations on defensive measures; 
Part 2 describes the legal design of the so-called Japanese “poison 
pill”, which is fundamentally different from its U.S. counterpart and 
belies a direct comparison in the Anglo-American context; Part 3 
illuminates the broader Japanese corporate governance 
environment for hostile takeovers  to provide a clear context for 
evaluating the “pill” in Japan on its own terms; Part 4 sets out what 
is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first analysis explaining what has 
been driving Japanese firms to dismantle their so-called “pills”.  The 
Article concludes by highlighting possible future research questions 
raised by the ostensible transplant of the American poison pill into 
Japanese soil. 
1. ANGLO-AMERICAN MEDICINE FOR AN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
DISEASE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Conceived in 1982 by the enterprising New York attorney 
Martin Lipton, the U.S.-style “poison pill” is a legal mechanism that 
a corporate board can adopt in response to an unsolicited takeover 
bid.  Its purpose, as originally conceptualized by Lipton, was to buy 
the board more time to plan a course of action that would “maximize 
shareholder value.”19 
Modern poison pills are diverse in form, but most are based on 
corporate “rights” that are triggered when an acquirer reaches a 
certain ownership threshold (typically from 10 to 20%) in the target 
 
 18 See infra note 213. 
 19 Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1043-
44 (2002).  
In September 1982, I published a memorandum describing the ‘Warrant 
Dividend Plan.’ The ‘warrant’ of the Warrant Dividend Plan was a security 
that could be issued by the board of directors of a target company (before 
or after it was faced with an unsolicited bid) that would have the effect of 
increasing the time available to the board to react to an unsolicited bid and 
allowing the board to maintain control over the process of responding to 
the bid.  Beginning at the end of 1982, in various forms it was used 
successfully by targets of hostile bids to gain time and maximize 
shareholder value. 
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company; once triggered, the target company’s shareholders, other 
than the acquirer, may purchase additional shares on favorable 
terms, with the effect of diluting the acquirer’s holdings.20  What 
made the poison pill attractive was that it could be implemented by 
the board on its own initiative, and without shareholder consent.21  
This revolutionary legal device soon obtained the imprimatur of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in a line of cases decided in the 1980s,22 
and made it possible for the board to “just say no” to any hostile bid 
by deciding to adopt a poison pill.23 
Notwithstanding a decades-long normative debate about 
whether a board should have the right to “just say no” to a takeover 
bid,24 the creation and adoption of the poison pill fundamentally 
shifted the balance of corporate governance power from 
 
 20 Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Control Transactions, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 205, 216 
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed., Oxford University Press 2017); see also STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 418-23 (3rd ed., Foundation Press 2015) (providing 
a concise introduction to the modern poison pill comprising “flip-in”, “flip-over’, 
and “redemption” elements). 
 21 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 909 (2002) (“At 
least in the first instance, poison pills are adopted unilaterally by the board of 
directors.  Indeed, the fact that the pill did not require shareholder approval was 
one of its main attractions.”). 
 22 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2.d 858 (Del. 1985) (requiring directors to rely on 
an informed view of the corporation’s intrinsic value when making takeover-
related decisions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
(accepting utility of takeover defenses and directors’ discretion to deploy them 
subject to an enhanced business judgment rule); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (directors not required to maximize short-term 
value of companies, save where the company was to be sold for cash); Moran v. 
Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (permitting boards to adopt 
the poison pill, and recognizing the board’s power to ‘just say no’ until they were 
replaced by the shareholders; judicial review of the board’s use of the poison pill 
subject to the Unocal enhanced business judgment rule); Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 23 See Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, supra note 11, at 1941, 1944-
47; Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover 
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 604 (1994) (“Thus, in a curious way, the logic of Time 
and Unocal validates the use of the poison pill for a ‘just say no’ defense . . . .“). 
 24 The debate over the proper role of the board in hostile takeovers can be 
traced back at least as far as Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper 
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 
(1981) and Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against 
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).  For a typical exchange 
between the two camps, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Lipton, supra note 19. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
696 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
shareholders to boards25—with independent directors 
concomitantly becoming the linchpin in the exercise of this new 
found board power.26  The magnitude of this shift is illuminated by 
the defeatist tone struck by one of America’s leading pro-
shareholder corporate governance commentators in the 1980s: 
The takeover wars are over.  Management won.  Although 
hostile tender offers remain technically possible, the legal 
and financial barriers in their path are far higher today than 
they were a few short years ago.  As a result, it will be 
difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in takeover battles, 
even if shareholders support the insurgents’ efforts . . . . This 
remarkable transformation in the market for corporate 
control resulted from the emergence of the “poison pill” as 
an effective antitakeover device . . .27 
In 1995, 60% of S&P 1500 companies adopted the poison pill,28 
and between 1996–2000 every hostile acquirer in the U.S. 
encountered a target armed with one.29  Hostile acquisitions fell 
 
 25 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race 
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189 (1999) (“Poison pills 
have altered fundamentally the allocation of power between managers and 
shareholders.”); Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Frank and Steven’s 
Excellent Corporate-Raiding Adventure, ATLANTIC (May 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/frank-and-stevens-
excellent-corporate-raiding-adventure/521436/ [https://perma.cc/V937-BXYJ] 
(“Eventually, companies developed defenses, most notably the “poison pill,” which 
dilutes the stake (and voting rights) of anyone who acquires a substantial amount 
of stock without first obtaining the board’s approval.  By the 1990s, power had been 
returned to management.”). 
 26 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526 (2007) 
(“The price of the power to “just say no” to a hostile bidder was a board that 
consisted of a majority of independent directors and a process that would call on 
those directors to exercise (at least the appearance of) independent judgment.”) 
 27 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with 
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993).  Grundfest would also 
say: “With the demise of the hostile takeover, shareholders can no longer expect 
much help from the capital markets in disciplining or removing inefficient 
managers . . . . As a result, corporate America is now governed by directors who are 
largely impervious to capital market or electoral challenges.” Id. at 862, 864.  In a 
similar, critical vein, see Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder 
Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 837 (1998). 
 28 John C Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1307 (2001). 
 29 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. 
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precipitously over the 1980s,30 and remained low until through the 
1990s,31 a phenomenon attributed at least in part to the poison pill.32  
The M&A market also shifted decisively in the U.S. toward 
negotiated, “friendly” acquisitions33 as the line between “hostile” 
and “friendly” takeovers blurred.34 
 
L. REV. 887, 926-27 (2002) (including pills adopted before the takeover attempt (i.e. 
the “pre-bid” variety), or “morning after” poison pills adopted as an immediate 
response to hostile bids). 
 30 Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at 879 n.33 (2002) (“Hostile acquisitions fell 
from almost $127 billion in 1988 to about $45.5 billion in 1989, to a little more than 
$11 billion in 1990.”). 
 31 Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 753, 761-62 (2000) (reporting that hostile acquisitions made up a minuscule 
proportion of total M&A activity, but with a rebound in 1999). 
 32 Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, supra note 11, at 1931-32; see also 
Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes but 
Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 358 (2000) (“Takeover bids are no longer a 
major device for eliminating under-performing management because management 
has devised effective defensive tactics that make purchase-type takeovers 
impractical.  The principal defensive weapon today is a “poison pill” . . . .”). 
 33 Hamilton, supra note 32, at 358 (“Thus, in the United States today, takeover 
bids are usually negotiated acquisitions rather than truly external bids.  A surprise 
unsolicited bid may be used to get the target’s attention and to open discussions, 
but negotiation then usually follows in order to defuse the poison pill and other 
defenses.”). 
 34 Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at 880-81; Paul Davies, Control Shifts via Share 
Acquisition Contracts with Shareholders (Takeovers), in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 561-62 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe 
eds., OUP 2018) (“ ‘Just say no’ may be an accurate description of the formal power 
held by target directors under the plan, but ‘just say no’ did not become an accurate 
description of how target directors behaved.”  . . .  The combined effect of [two 
developments in U.S. corporate governance] was to change “just say no” into “just 
say yes, if it is a good price.”). 
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Before long, shareholder-friendly academics,35 proxy advisory 
firms,36 and activist shareholders37 responded by pushing for 
 
 35 See, e.g., Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, supra note 11, at 512 (2001).  
However realistic the threat of a tidal wave of junk bond financed, two-
tier, bust-up takeovers, assisted by unthoughtful shareholders, may have 
appeared to the Delaware courts in 1985, we know now that it was a 
chimera.  Between bidder and target now stand large sophisticated 
shareholders with carefully considered views of corporate governance. 
Shareholder initiated bylaws provide an imperfect, but realistic, way to 
turn back the clock. 
See also Bebchuk, supra note 24, at 1035.  
The proposed approach—precluding incumbents who lose one election 
from maintaining pills—would take away from pills the special 
antitakeover power that they have in the presence of a staggered board.  
Given that about half of public companies now have staggered boards, a 
development with profound effects on the market for corporate control, 
this approach would not address an issue that is merely theoretical.  
Rather, it would substantially reduce boards’ ability to block offers and 
would restore the safety valve of an effective shareholder vote in firms 
with staggered boards.  
See also Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Anti-Activist Poison Pills (ECGI Working 
Paper No 364/2017, August 2017) 45, http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2928883 
accessed Jan. 14, 2019 [https://perma.cc/R4FK-LMZP]. 
With the caveat that purely economic exposure should generally not count 
towards the threshold, we would regard non-discriminatory pills with a 
20% threshold as presumptively valid.  Such pills seem overall reasonably 
designed to prevent creeping control, and often serve to maintain a 
balanced election process, without significantly impeding an activist.  On 
the other hand, even if economic exposure does not count, we would 
regard anti-activist pills with a threshold of less than 10% and pills with a 
“wolf-pack” trigger to be presumptively invalid.  Such pills are not a 
reasonable response to any cognizable threat and impose excessive 
restrictions on the ability of an activist to conduct a credible contest and 
communicate with other shareholders.  
 36 Francis J. Aquila, Adopting a Poison Pill in Response to Shareholder Activism, 
PRACTICAL LAW  24-25 (Apr. 2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/
files/upload/Apr16_InTheBoardroom.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHN3-MXGM] 
(“However, institutional investors and proxy advisory firms are generally wary of 
corporate defenses such as poison pills because these defenses are generally 
perceived to be merely intended to achieve board entrenchment.  The perceived 
abuses of the earliest poison pills also taint the image of the poison pill.  As a result 
of the substantial pressure from institutional investors and proxy advisory firms, 
most U.S. companies have eliminated or watered down their poison pills.  As of 
December 2015, only 19 of the companies in the S&P 500 maintained any poison pill 
at all.”); ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services), United States Proxy Voting 
Guidelines: Benchmark Policy Recommendations 26 (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-
Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4BN-D7QD] (recommending a case-by-case 
approach to management proposals on ratification of poison pills, and specifying 
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limitations on or removal of poison pills and other impediments to 
takeovers such as staggered boards.38  These efforts resulted in the 
number of companies with a traditional anti-takeover poison pill 
declining by over half over the 2000s;39 by 2017, only 65 companies 
 
that rights plans should have attributes including a “term of no more than three 
years” and no “dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand, or similar feature that limits the 
ability of a future board to redeem the pill”).  An earlier draft of ISS’ policy for 2018 
would have gone further by recommending voting against or withholding the vote 
from all board nominees if the adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12 
months: ISS, 2018 Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates Benchmark Policy Changes 
for U.S., Canada, and Brazil, at 6 (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/
file/policy/active/updates/Americas-Policy-Updates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZLN-FN99]. 
 37 Jessica Hall, Hostile Takeovers Hit Record as Market Swoons, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 
2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mergers-hostiles/hostile-takeovers-
hit-record-as-market-swoons-idUSTRE48S2P120080929 [https://perma.cc/E2LW-
MSJM] (“Hostile takeovers have more than doubled to a record level in the United 
States so far this year, boosted by falling stock prices and weakened corporate 
defenses . . . . In addition to the weakness in the U.S. stock market, with the Dow 
Jones industrials down over 16% this year, hostile bidders gained an advantage in 
recent years after many companies lowered their takeover defenses in the name of 
good corporate governance . . . .’The activist movement and the response by many 
companies to create more shareholder-friendly features—such as the 
declassifications of boards, reductions in the numbers of poison pills—makes 
hostile bids more likely to be successful,’ Selig said.”) (describing instances of 
backlash from institutional investors). 
 38 Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2002) (arguing that a 
staggered board “offers a more powerful antitakeover defense than has previously 
been recognized”).  A concerted effort led by Professor Lucian Bebchuk (Harvard 
Law School) has led to a substantial decrease in staggered boards among the largest 
U.S. listed companies.  Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards/ [https://perma.cc/SFF5-LD64] 
(noting that the Shareholder Rights Project led by Bebchuk has succeeded in 
prompting one-third of S&P 500 companies with a staggered board to declassify, 
and that by 2012 only 126 S&P 500 companies had staggered boards compared to 
302 in 2002); ‘Declassifications’ (Shareholder Rights Project 2017), 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/9SUM-RGGY] (reporting 102 declassifications attributable to 
the Shareholder Rights Project from the 2012 to 2015 proxy seasons). 
 39 Matteo Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Apr. 3, 2011), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/04/03/poison-pills-in-2011 
[https://perma.cc/GT48-MSNT] (observing that the number of corporations with 
poison pills fell from more than 2,200 in 2001 to fewer than 900 in 2011).  In recent 
years, pills that could be triggered at the much lower ownership threshold of 5% 
ostensibly to protect net operating losses (NOLs)—“NOL poison pills”—have 
gained popularity.  See Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
137, 191 (2016) (arguing that “the most effective and probable use of the NOL 
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in the S&P 1500, or about 4%, maintained a poison pill, down from 
54% in 2005.40 
Although, at first blush, these dramatic statistics suggest the 
death of the poison pill and the power of U.S. boards to “just say 
no”, a more in-depth analysis suggests that the poison pill is still 
surprisingly important and the shift in corporate governance power 
back to U.S. shareholders is far from incomplete—or, arguably, has 
hardly occurred at all.  Boards still exercise their power to “just say 
no” by adopting a poison pill not ex ante, but in response to concrete 
takeover threats from time to time.41  In addition, all listed 
companies in the United States, even those without an active pill in 
place, received the effect of the “shadow pill”—as boards can easily 
adopt a poison pill at a moment’s notice if the threat of a takeover 
arises.  Thus, in effect, every listed company in the United States 
always has a (shadow) poison pill in place.42  Suffice it to say that the 
 
poison pill is to thwart activist shareholders, with the existence of the deferred tax 
asset providing pre-textual cover for the board”).  The only poison pill ever 
triggered is of the NOL pill variety; see Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 
A.3d 586 (Del. 2010). 
 40 Kosmas Papadopoulos et al., U.S. Board Study: Board Accountability Practices 
Review, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES 13 (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/board-accountability-
practices-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWS2-FJ56]. 
 41 Netflix Adopts Poison Pill, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 5, 2012), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/netflix-adopts-poison-
pill/[https://perma.cc/UX2T-QTRZ] (“With Carl C. Icahn knocking on its front 
door, Netflix has put up the traditional first line of defense against a corporate 
takeover.”).  Steven Davidoff Solomon, Hostile Takeovers Abound, but Success Is No 
Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/business/dealbook/hostile-takeovers-
abound-but-success-is-no-guarantee.html [https://perma.cc/393X-H5CR] (“Bayer 
has made a $62 billion bid for Monsanto.  It, too, has missed the deadline for 
nominations for Monsanto’s board.  And Monsanto has yet to adopt a poison pill, 
although this can be done in a matter of hours.  Because Bayer would have to obtain 
antitrust approval before buying a substantial number of Monsanto shares, 
Monsanto does not have to rush. . . .  The Andersons has not yet adopted a poison 
pill, a fact it has trumpeted.  But it really does not need to take this defensive 
maneuver.”). 
 42 John C Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 286-91 (2000) (based on a study of 92 bids 
from 1996 to 2000).  See also Francis J. Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Poison Pills Find 
New Life as “Raider-Like” Activism is on the Rise, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2014/09/ke
eping-current-sawyer-201409.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4L6-3VL7] 
(“Instead of maintaining 10-year poison pills as was typical in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the standard practice now is to keep a poison pill ‘on the shelf’ and take it out on 
an as-needed basis.  If a company has fully briefed its board on the poison pill’s 
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poison pill has made its mark on corporate governance in the United 
States, not only when it burst onto the scene in the 1980s, but even 
today as a central device for board power lurking in the shadows of 
the U.S. corporate governance environment. 
In the U.K., the legal prohibition on boards adopting defensive 
measures without shareholder approval has prevented the pill from 
having any impact in the world’s second largest market for 
corporate control.43  In this context, it appeared—at least when 
viewed through an American lens—to be an epochal comparative 
corporate governance moment when the Japanese government 
released its Takeover Guidelines in 2005, which ostensibly made the 
poison pill legally available in Japan.44  The idea that one of the most 
important legal mechanisms in modern American corporate 
governance had been transplanted into the world’s third largest 
economy,45 and the third largest stock market,46 captured the 
attention of leading corporate governance academics and pundits in 
the U.S..47 In the two years following the government officially 
 
effects and prepared all the paperwork in advance, adopting a ‘shelf’ poison pill 
can be a fait accompli in very little time.”). 
 43 For a leading account comparing the divergence in takeover regulation 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, see John Armour & David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar 
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO L.J. 1727 (2007). 
 44 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry & Ministry of Justice, Guidelines 
Regarding Takeover Defense for the Purposes of Protection and Enhancement of Corporate 
Value and Shareholders’ Common Interests (May 27, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/
policy/economy/keiei_innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_hontai.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QMX-BS8Y] [hereinafter Takeover Guidelines]. 
 45 As of October 2018, in nominal terms, after the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China.  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
(October 2018)—GDP, current prices, IMF DATAMAPPER (2018), 
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC
/WEOWORLD/JPN [https://perma.cc/6MSH-8YW4] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019). 
 46 As of May 2019, and after the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.  See 
M. Szmigiera, Largest Stock Exchange Operators, Listed by Market Cap of Listed 
Companies 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/270126/largest-
stock-exchange-operators-by-marketcapitalization-of-listed-companies 
[https://perma.cc/5DXH-SREE] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
 47 Ronald J. Gilson, The Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (arguing that “the poison pill has the potential to 
be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it has been in the United States, both 
because of the absence of ameliorating institutions in Japan, and because . . . the 
forces for change . . . outside the market for corporate control are significantly less 
strong than in the U.S.”), 44 (noting that Japan serves as a useful “second data 
point” on how poison pills affect the mark for corporate control); Milhaupt, supra 
note 13, at 2216 (observing that Japan’s endorsement of the poison pill and 
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sanctioning the Japanese “poison pill,” hundreds of listed 
companies in Japan adopted it.48  The obvious question became: 
would the “poison pill” have the same watershed impact on 
Japanese corporate governance as it had in the United States in the 
1980s?  To answer this, we first need to be absolutely clear on one 
thing:  what exactly is Japan’s so-called “poison pill” as a matter of 
law?  
2. MEDICINE FOR PERCEIVED JAPANESE CORPORATE ILLS: THE 
STRUCTURE AND LEGAL NATURE OF JAPAN’S SO-CALLED “PILL” 
One of comparative corporate law’s greatest and most 
intractable challenges is terminological.  Proper use of legal 
terminology ensures analytical rigor and highlights seemingly 
minor, but otherwise decisive, differences between legal 
mechanisms in how they operate in their respective contexts.  A 
preliminary note on terminology thus is in order.  In this Article, we 
consistently use the term “defensive measures” (as a direct 
translation of bōeisaku) when referring to Japanese anti-takeover 
defenses in general.  As we discuss below, it is misleading to speak 
of Japanese defensive measures as “poison pills”;  we therefore 
firmly part ways with a number of commentators on this point.49  
Hence, “poison pill” without qualification is used exclusively to 
describe the U.S.-model anti-takeover defense, whereas in the 
Japanese context, any references to “poison pill” or “pill” will be 
qualified with “so-called” or inverted commas. 
 
Delaware takeover law as “a remarkable example of the transplantation of foreign 
institutions, and potentially as a watershed moment in the evolution of corporate 
law and governance in the world’s [then-]second largest economy”). 
 48 Fujishima Yūzō, Baishū Bōeisaku wo meguru Kinji no Dōkō (買収防衛策を巡る
近時の動向) [Recent Trends in Defensive Measures] DAIWA INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH: 
CONSULTING REPORT (Feb. 20, 2009) 2 tbl 1, https://www.dir.co.jp/report/
research/capital-mkt/esg/09022001cg.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2VB-LBQZ]. 
 49 E.g., Gilson, supra note 47, at 24-25 (referring to Japanese anti-takeover 
defenses as “the poison pill”); Zenichi Shishido, Introduction: The Incentive Bargain 
of the Firm and Enterprise Law: A Nexus of Contracts, Markets, and Laws, in ENTERPRISE 
LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE US AND JAPAN 33 (Zenichi Shishido 
ed., 2014) (“[S]everal mechanisms have been invented to reduce shareholder ability 
to disrupt management . . . [including] Japanese-style ‘poison pills’ in Japan.”); 
Toshiaki Yamanaka, Corporate Boards in Europe and Japan: Convergence 
and Divergence in Transition, 19 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 503, 516 (2018) (“[M]ore than 
three hundred public firms have introduced the ‘Japanese version’ of the poison 
pill since 2005.”). 
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In the discussion that follows, we draw on the two-category 
classification adopted in Japanese legal discourse:  ex-post measures 
and ex-ante measures.50  After introducing each category in turn (in 
2.1 and 2.2, respectively), we contextualize Japan’s defensive 
measures and associated legal norms by critically comparing them 
with the U.S. and the U.K. (2.3).  The comparative exercise exposes 
fundamental differences between Japan and the U.S. and U.K. and 
the importance of properly understanding Japan’s defensive 
measures on their own terms. 
2.1. Ex-Post Measures 
Ex-post measures are adopted only after a corporation has been 
specifically targeted by a corporate raider.  The two classic defensive 
measures available to the corporation are:  (1) share or share-option51 
placement,52 which is the issuance of shares or share options to a 
specific party who is friendly to incumbent management;  or (2) 
option allotment, by which share options are issued to all existing 
shareholders in a target corporation but with the options exercisable 
by all shareholders except the raider.53  The latter—option 
allotment—may be considered to be a rough equivalent to a pill 
implemented after a hostile takeover attempt has commenced.  In 
Japan, neither variant has escaped judicial scrutiny entirely intact. 
Share or share-option placements, which can be used by 
management to alter the shareholding structure of a company, may 
be challenged in court by aggrieved shareholders.  Under Japan’s 
corporate law legislation, a shareholder who is likely to suffer 
prejudice from a share or share-option placement may apply for an 
injunction restraining the placement on two grounds:  (1) 
 
 50 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 22-38 (describing Japan’s 
overall regulatory framework on hostile takeovers and distinguishing it from the 
Anglo-American model). 
 51 The unofficial Japanese Government translation of shin-kabu yoyaku-ken is 
“share option,” but they are also commonly translated as “warrants” in English 
language-scholarly and business literature. 
 52 Also often called “share issuances” in the literature, the word “placement” 
is used here to emphasize the action of “placing” the shares with a specific party or 
parties as opposed to a general issue (“allotment”) to all shareholders. 
 53 In the early years, the raider’s options might, in some circumstances, be 
redeemable for cash, or exercisable subject to conditions.  See infra notes 80-82 and 
accompanying text. 
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unlawfulness or (2) an “extremely unfair” method of placement.54  
Most challenges proceed under the “extremely unfair” limb—out of 
which the Japanese courts have developed the “primary purpose 
rule.”  Briefly stated, if the primary purpose of the placement (i.e., 
the purpose that takes precedence over other legitimate purposes 
such as raising capital) is to maintain control of the company, the 
court may grant an injunction restraining the placement.55 
It is important to note that Japan’s primary purpose rule was 
developed not as part of directors’ duties but rather as an 
interpretative gloss on a specific corporate law provision governing 
shareholders’ rights.56  The rule’s focus on capital-raising, which is 
inseparable from the nature of the statutory provision from which 
the rule developed, is also a limiting factor.  As Milhaupt and Pistor 
astutely observed, “the [primary purpose] rule is not well suited to 
judging the reasonableness of other types of defensive measures, 
including the U.S.-style poison pill, that have no corporate finance 
function.”57  It is thus not entirely clear how the primary purpose 
rule in its original form applies in the context of defensive measures 
 
 54 For shares, Companies Act, art.  210 provides: 
In the following cases, if shareholders are likely to suffer disadvantage, 
shareholders may demand that the Stock [Corporation] cease a share issue 
[of new shares] or disposition of Treasury Shares . . .  
(i) in cases where such share issue or disposition of Treasury Shares 
violates laws and regulations or the articles of incorporation; or 
(ii)  in cases where such share issue or disposition of Treasury Shares is 
effected by using a method which is extremely unfair. 
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Act. No. 86 of 2005, art. 210 (Japan).  The text is based 
on the Japanese Government’s unofficial (but widely used) translation at 
[https://perma.cc/AX7E-KYCP].  The equivalent provision for share options is 
Companies Act, art. 247. 
 55 See generally EGASHIRA KENJIRŌ, KABUSHIKI KAISHA-HŌ (株式会社法) [THE 
LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS (translated title by source author)] 773-75 (7th ed. 
Yūhikaku 2017); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 28-33 (describing the 
history of Japan’s primary purpose rule, distinguishing it from U.K. law, and 
illustrating its function in the case of Livedoor’s attempted hostile takeover bid for 
Nippon Broadcasting System). 
 56 See Yamanaka Toshiaki, Seitō mokuteki rūru ni yoru torishimariyaku ni taisuru 
kiritsu: eikoku 2006 kaisha-hō wo fumaete [Monitoring Directors with the Proper Purpose 
Test: Lessons from the UK Companies Act 2006] 36-37 (Kinyū shōjihō [Fin. & Comm. 
Law] Working Paper December 2014) [https://perma.cc/K2Y8-SBJ5] (describing 
how the primary purpose rule operates in practice). 
 57 CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT 
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AROUND THE WORLD 93 (2008). 
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other than share placements;  we discuss this below in the context of 
the watershed Livedoor case. 
Second, it is widely recognized that Japanese courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to find in a given case that an improper 
purpose took precedence over other seemingly legitimate reasons 
that would require the company to raise capital.58  In most cases, all 
the target board had to do to survive a shareholder challenge was to 
refer to some need to raise capital—a burden that was easily 
discharged in practice.59  Once the court made a finding that the 
company was in need of capital, the court would also, in principle, 
respect the discretion of the directors as to the specific means for 
raising finance.60  Hence, the prevailing jurisprudence on Japan’s 
primary purpose rule suggested a strong judicial inclination 
towards upholding the target board’s decision to issue shares to a 
friendly stable-shareholder61 in the context of an ongoing takeover 
bid.62 
In contrast to the relatively well-established jurisprudence on 
share placements, the question of whether post-bid share option 
placements would pass scrutiny under the primary purpose rule 
was answered more recently in the landmark case of Livedoor 
(2005).63  The facts may be simply stated.  Livedoor, an internet 
company, shocked the nation by launching a hostile takeover bid for 
Nippon Broadcasting System (“NBS”), a leading broadcaster in 
Japan.  NBS management quickly responded by announcing a plan 
to issue share options to a friendly stable-shareholder as a defensive 
measure, which, if exercised, would have dramatically diluted 
 
 58 EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773. 
 59 See Tomotaka Fujita, Case No. 29: Corporate Law—Takeovers—Issuance of Share 
Options as Defence Measure—Principal Purpose Rule, in BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN: CASES 
AND COMMENTS 317-18 (Moritz Bälz et al. eds., 2012) (discussing how in shareholder 
suits, target companies will “most likely lose the battle if the purpose is recognized 
as ‘control’ ” but will “easily prevail if the court rules the purpose is ‘finance’ or 
another legitimate purpose”); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 29 (citing 
the wide recognition that Japanese courts tend to uphold target boards’ decisions 
as long as those boards refer to “some need to raise capital”). 
 60 EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773. 
 61 On this concept, see infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 62 Compare cases cited at EGASHIRA, supra note 55, at 773-74 (discussing cases 
in which injunctions were not granted), with those at id., at 774 (discussing cases 
finding an improper purpose to dilute a particular shareholder, majority of which 
were decided more recently). 
 63 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 30-33 (describing the events of 
the Livedoor case, the court’s reasoning, and the thoughts of various commentators 
as the events occurred). 
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Livedoor’s stake in NBS.  Livedoor applied to the Tokyo District 
Court for an injunction restraining NBS from completing the 
placement of the share options.  The fact that the options, if 
exercised, would have more than doubled NBS’ share capital made 
it practically impossible for NBS to argue that the “primary 
purpose” of the issuance was to raise capital and not to entrench 
management.64 
Unsurprisingly, the Tokyo District Court granted the injunction 
in a decision upheld on appeal to the Tokyo High Court.65  The 
Tokyo High Court, however, crafted an exception to the primary 
purpose rule, laying down four limited circumstances in which a 
target corporation’s board is permitted to conduct a share or share-
option placement even where the “primary purpose” was 
maintaining control in order to protect shareholders’ interests 
(rather than to raise corporate capital).  These four circumstances 
recognized by the Court (albeit in obiter) as clearly deleterious to the 
interests of the target corporation’s shareholders are: 
(1)  greenmail (i.e. acquiring the target’s shares with the 
intention of forcing the target to buy them back at a higher 
price); 
(2)  temporarily taking control of and running the target to 
advance the acquirer’s interests at the target’s expense, such 
as by acquiring the target’s core assets at low prices; 
(3)  pledging as collateral for debts of the acquirer or its 
associated corporations the target’s assets, or repaying such 
debts using the target’s funds; or 
(4)  temporarily taking control of the management of the 
target to sell off valuable assets not currently related to the 
target’s business, and distributing the proceeds as 
 
 64 See Fujita, supra note 59, at 318 n.9 (noting that NBS did not even attempt to 
make this argument but instead issued a press release announcing that its actions 
were intended to preserve the nature of the firm as a mass media company). 
 65 Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.]  Mar. 23, 2005, 1173 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 125.  See Fujita, supra note 59, at 313-15 (summarizing the Livedoor 
case).  See also KIGYŌ-BAISHŪ WO MEGURU SHOSŌ TO NIPPON-HŌSŌ-JIKEN KANTEI-IKEN (
企業買収をめぐる諸相とニッポン放送事件鑑定意見) [VARIOUS ASPECTS ON 
TAKEOVERS AND EXPERTS’ OPINION IN THE NIPPON BROADCASTING SYSTEM CASE] (別冊
商事法務編集部 [Editorial Board of Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu] ed., 別冊商事法務289号 
[Vol. 289, Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu], Shōji Hōmu 2005). 
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dividends, or disposing of the target’s shares at a price as 
inflated by the dividends.66 
The principles laid down by the Tokyo High Court in Livedoor 
were soon incorporated directly into the Takeover Guidelines issued 
jointly by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the 
Ministry of Justice in 2005.67  Although expressly framed as non-
binding in a strict legal sense,68 the Guidelines’ stated aim was 
nonetheless to serve as a code of conduct for the business 
community.69  Hence, notwithstanding its amorphous legal nature, 
this document is highly instructive, as it states in no uncertain terms 
that “it is legitimate and reasonable for a joint-stock corporation to 
adopt defensive measures designed to protect and enhance 
shareholder interests by preventing certain shareholders from 
acquiring a controlling stake in the corporation.”70  Despite their 
initial setback in the courts, defensive measures nonetheless 
received the imprimatur of Japan’s politico-legal establishment. 
The second landmark case, Bull-Dog Sauce (2007),71 remains the 
only case in which the Supreme Court of Japan, the nation’s apex 
court, addresses the question of the legality of defensive measures 
 
 66 See CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, CORPORATE VALUE REPORT 33 n.57 
(May 27, 2005), [https://perma.cc/N85Z-EDQQ] (describing the four exceptions as 
takeover defense measures); Fujita, supra note 59, at 315, 319 (describing the four 
exceptions as means of protecting shareholders from hostile buyers and discussing 
potential problems these exceptions might cause);  Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra 
note 3, at 33 (describing the four exceptions and asserting the court’s intent to use 
them as a filter “that would allow wealth-enhancing takeovers to proceed without 
interference from target boards, but still permit target boards to block wealth-
reducing hostile takeovers”). 
 67 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 4 n.1 (“The following can be cited as 
typical defensive measures to protect and enhance shareholder interests[:]  (i) 
Takeover defense measures to prevent takeovers that would cause an apparent 
damage to shareholder interests [in any of the four Livedoor circumstances].”). 
 68 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“The Guidelines are not legally binding.”). 
 69 See id. at 3 (“The mission of the Guidelines is to change the business 
community from one without rules concerning takeovers to one governed by fair 
rules applicable to all. To prepare for the upcoming era of M&A activity, we expect 
the Guidelines to become the code of conduct for the business community in Japan 
by being respected and, as the need arises, revised.”). 
 70 Id. at 4. 
 71 Supreme Ct. [Saikō Saibansho] August 7, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2215.  See Hiroshi Oda, Case No. 30: Corporate Law—
Takeovers—Defensive Measures—Equality of Shareholders, in BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN: 
CASES AND COMMENTS 323 (Moritz Bälz et al. eds., 2012) (summarizing the Bull-Dog 
Sauce case). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
708 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
based on option allotments.72  This case involved a bid by Steel 
Partners, a U.S. private equity fund, for all outstanding shares of 
Bull-Dog Sauce Co. Ltd,73 the manufacturer of a popular series of 
Worcestershire-type sauces.  In response to the bid, Bull-Dog Sauce’s 
board proposed the defensive measure of allotting three share 
options per share to all existing shareholders.  All shareholders 
except Steel Partners would be eligible to exercise the options, 
whereas Steel Partners would be entitled, in the event that the 
options were exercised, to receive in lieu of shares a cash payment 
of over $2 billion.  In other words, Bull-Dog’s defensive measure 
would have financially compensated Steel Partners for the 
discriminatory issuance of shares to the other shareholders.  
Critically, “as the bid was made shortly before Bull-Dog Sauce’s 
annual general meeting, the board decided to put its proposed 
defensive measure before the shareholders for approval.”74  
Astoundingly, the proposed measure was approved by 88.7% of a 
qualified majority of shareholders;  in effect, almost every 
shareholder (excluding Steel Partners) voted in favor. 
Undaunted, Steel Partners applied for an interim injunction 
restraining the option allotment—“a strange turn of events 
considering that none of the [other] shareholders appeared to be 
willing to sell their shares to the hostile acquirer.”75  The Tokyo 
District Court declined to grant the Steel Partners’ application for an 
injunction in a decision that was upheld on appeal to the Tokyo 
High Court and further appeal to the Supreme Court of Japan.  
According to the Supreme Court, target shareholders have the right 
 
 72 But see Oda, supra note 71, at 329-30 (arguing that the case’s significance will 
be limited because of its unique circumstances); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra 
note 3, at 37 (asserting that, in accord with the views of “leading Japanese 
academics,” the case’s “unusual circumstances” distinguish it from typical hostile 
takeover cases). 
 73 See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce for the Japanese Soul? Courts, 
Corporations, and Communities—A Comment on Haley’s View of Japanese Law, 8 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 353-56 (2009) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce] 
(summarizing the Bull-Dog Sauce case and arguing (id. at 356) that one effect of the 
case “may be to encourage the (re-)establishment of corporate ties to stable, long-
term shareholders”). 
 74 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36.  See also Oda, supra note 71, at 
324 (describing the board’s view that the bid would harm the company and its 
decision to resist the bid before the annual shareholders’ meeting). 
 75 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36.  See also Oda, supra note 71, at 
324 (describing the bases of the injunction, which are “that the issuing of share 
options was against the equality of shareholders” and that it was conducted “in a 
grossly unfair manner”). 
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to decide whether the risk of damage to the corporation justifies the 
adoption of defensive measures.  The Supreme Court further held 
that, in light of the “fair and adequate measures” taken by the target 
to compensate the bidder for depriving the bidder of its right to 
exercise its options, “the target’s discriminatory treatment of the 
bidder as a shareholder was justifiable.”76 
Notwithstanding the buzz generated by the Bull-Dog Sauce case 
and the jurisprudence arising therefrom within Japan77 and in the 
international press and scholarly literature,78 the weight of its legacy 
today is debatable.  First, the facts were highly unusual.  Given that 
nearly all shareholders of the target supported the defensive 
measure, one might reasonably question why the defensive measure 
was required at all if the existing shareholders were unwilling to 
tender their shares to the acquirer in the first place.  Whether major 
shareholders of future targets of hostile takeovers would similarly 
rally in support of incumbent management is open to serious 
 
 76 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 36-37.  See also Oda, supra note 71, 
at 326 (citing the Court’s conclusion that the allocation of share options was neither 
inadequate nor “against the idea of fairness”). 
 77 The leading commercial law periodical publisher in Japan dedicated a 442-
page special issue collecting documents relevant to the case.  See BURUDOGGU SŌSU 
NO HŌ-TEKI KENTŌ: BAISHŪ BŌEISAKU NI KANSURU SAIBAN KEIKA TO IGI (ブルドックソ
ース事件の法的検討—買収防衛策に関する裁判経過と意義) [LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE BULL-DOG SAUCE CASE: THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ON ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSIVE 
MEASURES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE] (別冊商事法務編集部 [Editorial Board of 
Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu] ed., 別冊商事法務311号 [Vol 311, Bessatsu Shōji Hōmu], Shōji 
Hōmu 2007). 
 78 E.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative 
Corporate Governance, in I FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24. 
AUGUST 2010 806, 808 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., De Gruyer 2010) (“The fact that 
the target shareholders had approved the defensive plan was a particularly 
significant factor in [the Bull-Dog Sauce] judgements.”); Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Japan 
High Court Keeps Bull-Dog Sauce From Steel Partners’ Jaws, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2007), 
[https://perma.cc/DG9U-YNX3] (discussing the effects of the Bull-Dog Sauce 
decision on Bull-Dog Sauce, Steel Partners, and the Japanese government); Hideki 
Kanda, Takeover Defences and the Role of Law: A Japanese Perspective, in  PERSPECTIVES 
IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 413, 420-22 (Michel Tison et al. eds., 
2009) (relating the characteristics of the Bull-Dog Sauce case to Japanese statutory 
law); Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 73, at 353-56 (summarizing the case and 
discussing its potential effects, particularly as they relate to contemporary hostile-
takeover developments); Nathan Rayne & Reiji Murai, Japan’s Bull-Dog OK’s Poison 
Pill for Steel Partners, REUTERS (June 24, 2007), [https://perma.cc/8FR6-H5TY] 
(arguing that the Bull-Dog Sauce case could set a precedent for the “hundreds of 
other firms” using poison pill defenses); Alison Tudor, Steel Partners Presses on with 
Bull-Dog Bid, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2007), [https://perma.cc/Z7RP-YW8S] (“[S]ome 
financial analysts fear the [Bull-Dog Sauce] ruling may erode investor appetite for 
the Japanese equity market.”). 
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question in light of changes to shareholding structure in Japanese 
firms since the mid-2000s (a point that we discuss below in Part 3). 
A further curiosity lay in Bull-Dog shareholders’ overwhelming 
support79 for a defensive measure that included a generous payment 
to the hostile acquirer, which may have been driven by good reasons 
at the time.80  However, the Corporate Value Study Group, in a 
second report released in June 2008, soon expressed its disapproval 
of defensive measures that would involve cash or financial payoffs 
to acquirers,81 and modern defensive measures typically no longer 
include such a feature.82  We move to modern defensive measures in 
the next Section.  
 
 79 Although beyond the scope the present Article, such curiosities may 
perhaps only make sense in a context where the alchemy of stable-shareholders and 
corporate cultural norms creates an impenetrable wall against the barbarians at the 
gate.  See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 37-41 (arguing that Japanese 
culture has formed a barrier to hostile takeovers), 40 (noting that “support for 
incumbent management by stable shareholders has consistently defeated takeover 
bids over the last several decades”). 
 80 See Iwakura Masakazu & Sasaki Shigeru, Burudoggu Sōsu ni yoru Tekitai-teki 
Baishū ni taisuru Takō Sochi (Ge Sono 2) (ブルドックソースによる敵対的買収に対す
る対抗措置（下その2) [Measures Against Hostile Acquisition by Bull-Dog Sauce (Part 
2.2)], 1825 SHŌJI HŌMU 36, 38 (2008) (observing that the issue of “economic equality” 
between the acquirer and the other shareholders came up during preliminary 
injunction proceedings, but that the Supreme Court did not go so far as to make the 
payment of appropriate compensation to the acquirer an absolute condition for a 
defensive measure). 
 81 See CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURES IN LIGHT 
OF RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 3-4 (June 30, 2008), [https://perma.cc/XE33-
6HX6] (“Granting cash or other financial benefits to the acquirers in implementing 
takeover defense measures invites the actual implementation.  As a result, it 
deprives shareholders of the opportunities of selling their shares to the acquirers 
after adequate time and information necessary for them to appropriately decide 
whether to support or oppose the takeovers or the opportunities for negotiation are 
ensured.  Therefore, it could prevent the formation of an efficient capital market.  
Thus, cash or other financial benefits should not be granted to the acquirers.”).  
Note, however, that the Takeover Guidelines based on the 2005 report of the 
Corporate Value Study Group was not updated. 
 82 See, e.g., M&A HŌ TAIKEI [COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF M&A LAWS IN JAPAN] 
(Mori Hamada Matsumoto ed., 2015) (describing common hostile takeover 
measures).  As early as 2008, defensive measures that no longer involved direct cash 
compensation to the acquirer were put in place; Marusan’s plan, for example, 
permitted the acquirer to exercise warrants provided that it divest part of its 
holdings via securities firms designated by the issuer.  Marusan Shōken ga Shingata 
no Baishū Bōeisaku, Tekitai-teki Bashū-sha ni mo Jōken-tsuki de Kenri Kōshi wo Nin’yō (
丸三証券が新型の買収防衛策、敵対的買収者にも条件付きで権利行使を容認) 
[Marusan Securities Adopts New-Type Defensive Measures, Exercise of Rights by Hostile 
Acquirers Subject to Conditions Approved]’ REUTERS JAPAN (May 16, 2008), 
[https://perma.cc/N85Z-EDQQ].  As a recent example, when Kaneka Corporation 
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2.2. Ex-Ante Measures: PRPs, or the So-Called “Japanese Poison Pill” 
The boom in ex-ante measures—which are adopted by 
companies before a specific takeover threat arises—can be traced 
back to the Takeover Guidelines jointly issued by two government 
ministries after consultation with stakeholders with the goal of 
“preventing excessive defensive measures, enhancing the 
reasonableness of takeover defense measures and thereby 
promoting the establishment of fair rules governing corporate 
takeovers in the business community.”83  The Guidelines did not 
only make it clear that potential targets may adopt defensive 
measures generally;84 by making express reference to pre-bid ex-ante 
defensive measures,85 it gave this yet-untested legal tool its blessing.  
Released in a pivotal year (2005), in which hostile takeover attempts 
reached a new high in the public consciousness, the Takeover 
Guidelines not only triggered a subsequent shift in jurisprudence but 
also gained a following among practitioners in Japan. 
Since the Guidelines were released, the most popular by 
consistently overwhelming margins—and the only feasible86—type 
 
revised its PRP, it stated that the revised plan made it clear that the acquirer’s 
warrants would not be redeemed for cash.  KANEKA CORPORATION, TŌSHA KABUSHIKI 
NO DAIKIBO KAITSUKE KŌI NI KANSURU TAIŌ SHISHIN (BAISHŪ BŌEISAKU) (当社株式の
大規模買付行為に関する対応方針（買収防衛策）の継続について) [ON THE 
CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY ON RESPONDING TO LARGE-SCALE ACQUISITION OF THIS 
CORPORATION’S SHARES (ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSIVE MEASURE)]’ (May 12, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/7YNB-LZFX]. 
 83 Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 1 (Introduction).  
 84 At the time, only ex-post defensive measures had been litigated, most 
recently in the Livedoor case.  See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 30-33 
(describing the events of the Livedoor case, the court’s reasoning, and the thoughts 
of various commentators as the events occurred).  
 85 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 6 (“In the process of adopting 
defensive measures in advance of an unsolicited takeover proposal . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 86 Defensive measures other than of the PRP variety include the “trust-type” 
measure.  See Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 (“Under a typical trust based scheme, the 
firm issues stock warrants to a trust bank with designated shareholders as 
beneficiaries of the trust.  When a hostile bid occurs, the pill is triggered, and the 
trust bank transfers the warrants to the shareholders.  The warrants have a 
discriminatory feature and the bidder has no right to exercise them, as the terms 
and conditions of the warrants usually provide that the warrants are not exercisable 
by the shareholders who own 20% or more of the firm’s outstanding stock.”).  See 
also infra Table 1.  Trust-type defensive measures, in contrast to the PRP, were never 
adopted by more than a mere handful of companies even in the earliest days.  See 
Kanda, supra note 78, at 418 (“Among 359 firms . . . 10 have trust-type or similar 
warrant schemes.”); Milhaupt, Bull-Dog Sauce, supra note 73, at 352 tbl. 1 (citing the 
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of defensive measures is a category of ex-ante measures known as 
jizen keikoku gata bōeisaku [“Pre-Warning Rights Plans”] (“PRPs”).87  
Strictly legally speaking, a PRP is nothing more than a statement of 
intention of how the board would act in the event of a hostile bid 
that takes the form of a press release issued by the target board.88  In 
the event of a potential takeover bid that may leave the bidder 
holding more than a certain percentage (usually 20%) of the issued 
shares, the acquirer is required to disclose information relevant to 
their acquisition plans to the target corporation’s board for 
consideration and evaluation.89  If the acquirer fails to disclose the 
required information, or the proposed acquisition is deemed to be 
deleterious to “corporate value” or not in the interests of the 
shareholders,90 there would be grounds to trigger the PRP. 
Possible variations as to the process by which a PRP is triggered 
include:  (1) a board resolution only; (2) a board resolution upon the 
 
proportion of trust-type defensive measures in July 2006 and July 2007 as being 
6.5% and 2.6%, respectively); infra Table 1 (showing the consistent and 
overwhelming dominance of the PRP over alternatives such as the trust-type 
defensive measure from 2009).  See also Fujimoto et al. (2007), infra note 154, at 34 
(pointing to the requirement for a special resolution of the shareholder meeting [i.e., 
a two-thirds vote] and the need to draft a detailed outline for the issuance of share 
warrants (発行要項) as reasons that the trust-type measure failed to catch on).  See 
also Baishū bōeisaku – kiso chishiki: raitsu puran – shintakugin ni yoyakuken – tokubetsu 
ketsugi nekku ni (買収防衛策、基礎知識――ライツプラン、信託銀に予約権、特別
決議ネックに。) [Defensive Measures—Basic Knowledge: Rights Plans – Issue of 
Options to Trust Banks – Special Resolution as Obstacle], NIKKEI SANGYŌ SHIMBUN 22 
(morning edition, June 20, 2006) (citing the requirement of a special resolution and 
the 30 to 40 million-yen fee payable to trust banks as reasons for the trust-type 
plan’s loss of market share). 
 87 Cf. Hideki Kanda, Corporate Governance in Japanese Law: Recent Trends and 
Issues, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 69, 73 (2015) (using the alternative nomenclature of 
“advance warning plan”). 
 88 See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed 
and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 254 (2011) 
(observing that “[u]nlike the U.S. shareholder rights plan, the pre-warning rights 
plan is not a legal instrument”). 
 89 Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797. 
 90 See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797-98; Armour et al., supra 
note 88, at 254 (asserting that a company may trigger a PRP if it “determines that 
the acquisition would damage the ‘corporate value of the company or the common 
interests of the shareholders’ ”); Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 (“[I]f a shareholder 
attempts to increase its stake to 20% or more of the firm’s outstanding stock . . . the 
shareholder is required to disclose and explain . . . its intent to hold such stock and 
what the shareholder would do for the firm.”). 
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recommendation of a special committee; or (3) a shareholder vote.91  
If triggered, the board would allot share options that are exercisable 
by shareholders other than the bidder and its associates.92  Although 
the Takeover Guidelines expressly contemplates the adoption of a PRP 
by board resolution,93 in practice, a shareholder vote is usually 
necessary when adopting or triggering a PRP.94  Most modern PRPs 
automatically expire after a period of one to three years.95  They may, 
however, be modified or renewed with shareholder approval or be 
abolished at any time by a resolution of the board or the shareholder 
meeting.96 
Compared with ex-post (i.e., post-bid) defensive measures, the 
modern PRP’s prospects of withstanding judicial scrutiny—if and 
when directly challenged—are open to even greater doubt.  The 
most relevant case on point is Nireco (2005).97  In that case, an early 
version of the PRP failed to survive judicial scrutiny, as the Tokyo 
District Court granted an injunction restraining the company from 
implementing the measure.98  The decision was sustained upon 
appeal to the Tokyo High Court.99  However, in contrast with 
 
 91 See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797; Armour et al., supra 
note 88, at 254 n.175 (listing three processes for triggering the issuance of warrants: 
“by simple board resolution,” “upon board resolution acting at the 
recommendation of an independent committee,” or “upon vote of the 
shareholders”); Kanda, supra note 78, at 419 & 419 n.16 (reporting that with the 
majority of PRPs, the decision to trigger the plan rests with a special, independent 
committee). 
 92 Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 798. 
 93 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 6 (“[I]t is not appropriate to reject 
outright the adoption of defensive measures by the board of directors when such 
measures enhance shareholder interests.”).  However, the Guidelines were also 
careful to stress that shareholders should be permitted to dismantle a board-
implemented defensive measure.  Id. 
 94 See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 5-6 (emphasizing the “principle of 
shareholders’ will” in the adoption of defensive measures).  Cf. Kanda, supra note 
78, at 419 (describing how in practice, most proposals for advance-warning-type 
defense measures obtain shareholder approval). 
 95 The overwhelming majority of PRPs have a three-year validity period.  See 
MARR, infra note 250, at 33 (showing that 349 of 383 PRPs as of Oct. 31, 2018, 366 of 
405 as of Dec. 31, 2017, and 395 of 443 as of Dec. 31, 2016 fall into this category). 
 96 Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 798. 
 97 For a discussion of the Nireco case, see Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 
3, at 35. 
 98 Tokyo District Court [Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho] June 1, 2005, 1186 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 274; Tokyo District Court [Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho] June 9, 2005, 
1186 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 265. 
 99 Tokyo High Court [Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho] June 15, 2005, 1186 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 254. 
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modern PRPs, the defensive measure in Nireco would have 
discriminated not only against the acquirer but also against another 
sub-group of “innocent” shareholders.100  With Nireco offering 
limited if any jurisprudential value, and no judgment having ever 
resulted from a modern PRP post-Nireco, modern PRPs have yet to 
undergo trial by fire.  Insofar as they continue to be primarily non-
legal and contingent in nature, we remain none the wiser as to the 
actual legal consequences that would flow from a triggered modern 
PRP.  Also, and perhaps most importantly, it should be stressed that 
the involvement of shareholder approval in either adopting, 
triggering, or renewing PRPs is noteworthy and—as discussed 
below—sets it apart from U.S. poison pills, which can clearly be 
implemented by the board, can be triggered automatically, and 
require no shareholder approval at any stage at all. 
2.3. Not Poison, Just Untested Medicine: Japanese Defensive Measures 
in Comparative Perspective 
Not many jurisdictions receive sustained attention from scholars 
and pundits in the English-language hostile takeovers literature, but 
three may claim that honor:  Japan, the U.K., and the U.S..  It is 
always tempting to minimize or overlook the substantive 
differences in the law of anti-takeover defenses between these three, 
whether because of the myopia that results from viewing one system 
through the lens of another or to paint an overly generalized picture 
 
 100 See Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 796 n.67; Armour et al., 
supra note 88, at 250 n.150 (describing the competing interests and bids of Fuji 
Television, Livedoor, and NBS).  The Takeover Guidelines (2005) also give as an 
example of an unacceptable scheme “a case where stock acquisition rights, etc. with 
the exercise conditioned on the initiation of a takeover are actually allocated to all 
shareholders before the start of a takeover, with a specific day prior to the start of 
the takeover as the record date for allocation (except where resolved or disclosed 
prior to the commencement of a takeover that stock acquisition rights will be 
allotted on condition that a takeover is commenced).  In such cases, it is likely that 
all shareholders acquiring stock after the record date, including those who are not 
the acquiring person, will incur unexpected losses.  In addition, the value of the 
stock owned by shareholders as of the record date may also drop significantly.  If 
the stock acquisition rights are subject to transfer restrictions, it is also possible that 
the shareholders cannot recover the portion of their investments corresponding to 
such drop in value.  In this way the takeover causes unforeseen losses for 
shareholders who are not acquiring persons.” Takeover Guidelines, supra note 44, at 
2 n.10. 
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of corporate governance convergence.101  In this part, we put any 
such temptation to rest by highlighting key differences between 
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., and make the case for understanding 
the Japanese legal context on its own terms. 
Primary purpose rule.  Commentators have picked up on apparent 
similarities102 between Japan’s judicially developed primary 
purpose rule on the one hand and the “no frustration rule” 
contained in the Takeover Code103 and “proper purpose duty” 
imposed on directors of target corporations as a matter of statutory 
and common law104 on the other.  Nonetheless, substantial 
differences exist.  First, Japan’s primary purpose rule is limited to 
share/share option placements and share option allotments.  By 
contrast, directors of U.K. companies are bound to exercise all the 
powers of their office (whether they concern share options or 
anything else that directors have the power to do) in accordance 
with the purpose of conferring those powers.105 
 
 101 On this theme, albeit in other corporate law contexts, see Dan W. Puchniak, 
The Derivative Action in Asia: A Complex Reality, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2012) 
(asserting the necessity of considering local factors like case law, economic forces 
and corporate governance institutions when attempting to understand how 
derivative action functions in Asia’s leading economies); Puchniak & Nakahigashi, 
supra note 3, at 42 (concluding that “in order to understand hostile takeovers in any 
given jurisdiction, it is best to understand that jurisdiction on its own terms); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 356-57 (2001) (outlining three forms of corporate governance, 
plus two forms of hybrids, but conceding that “[t]he diversity of circumstances 
suggests that there can be no general prediction of the mode that convergence of 
national corporate governance institutions may take.”). 
 102 See Armour et al., supra note 88, at 250 n.147 (“Doctrinally, this [primary 
purpose rule] is similar to U.K. common law.”). 
 103 See CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, r. 21.1 (providing that “the 
board must not, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting, take 
any action which may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated 
or in shareholders being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits” or take 
specific actions such as the issuance of shares or options). 
 104 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 28-29 (“[I]n its application 
from the 1980s until 2005, Japan’s ‘primary purpose rule’ could not be any more 
different than the United Kingdom’s ‘no frustration rule’ and ‘proper purpose’ 
duty.”); see also Yamanaka, supra note 56. 
 105 BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW ¶¶ 9-49 & 9-59 (5th ed., Oxford 
University Press 2018); R.C. Nolan, Controlling Fiduciary Power, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
293, 299 (2009) (“the proper purposes doctrine looks to the particular ends intended 
to be achieved through certain particular acts and determines whether such ends 
are contemplated (and therefore authorized) by the power in question.”) 
For the duty as codified, see Companies Act 2006 (c 46), § 171(b) (Duty to act within 
powers): 
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Second, the scope of Japan’s primary purpose rule does not 
overlap precisely with the U.K. proper purpose duty.  Although the 
Tokyo High Court in Livedoor enjoined the share option issuance on 
the facts, the court (and later, the Takeover Guidelines) recognized an 
exception to the primary purpose rule by suggesting that share or 
share option placements may be conducted even if the primary 
purpose was specifically to maintain corporate control.  The 
situation for the U.K. is different, as the board’s power to issue 
shares may be legitimately exercised for purposes other than raising 
capital.106  However, even setting aside the City Code’s non-
frustration rule,107 in no event may the power to issue shares108—or 
perhaps any other power109—be used to upset the existing balance 
of power within the company.  It also remains an open question in 
the U.K. as to whether a decision taken in pursuit of an improper 
 
A director of a company must— 
(a) act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and 
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred. 
Companies Act 2006 (c 46), § 171(b).  It is true that the “proper purpose duty” in the 
U.K. does take on special prominence in the context of board interference with 
shareholder control of the company (i.e., change of corporate control).  See ANDREW 
GRIFFITHS, CONTRACTING WITH COMPANIES 106 (2005) (“In practice, the ‘proper 
purposes’ doctrine has been invoked to prevent the board of a company from using 
its powers of management to interfere with the ‘ownership’ powers of the 
shareholders and thus their ultimate control of the company.”); HANNIGAN, supra ¶ 
9-57 (citing several cases where courts curbed directors’ attempts to manipulate the 
company through improper exercise of their power to allot shares).  For the leading 
case on the English position on the director’s duty to act for proper purposes in the 
context in change of control transactions, see Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc 
[2015] UKSC 71, [2016] 1 BCLC 1; see also Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
[1974] AC 821 (P.C.) (appeal taken from New South Wales). 
 106 See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821, 835-37 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from New South Wales).  See also id. at 837 (Lord Wilberforce) (stating 
that it is “too narrow an approach to say that the only valid purpose for which 
shares may be issued is to raise capital for the Company”); PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH 
WORTHINGTON, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 489-90, ¶16-26 (10th 
ed., 2016) (citing Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd) (“It was argued that the 
only proper purpose for which a share-issue power could be exercised was to raise 
new capital when the company needed it.  This was rejected as too narrow.”). 
 107 CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, r. 21.1. 
 108 DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 106, ¶ 16-27. 
 109 There is doubt as to whether the directors of a U.K. company even have the 
authority to adopt takeover defenses more generally.  In Criterion Properties plc v 
Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28, [2004] 1 WLR 1846, the House of Lords 
remanded for trial the issue of whether the directors of a U.K. company had the 
authority to enter into a “poison pill” arrangement by which a change of control in 
the company or the company’s managing director’s dismissal would trigger a put 
option on substantially advantageous terms for a particular major shareholder. 
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purpose—among other concurrent, legitimate purposes—would be 
permitted to stand.110 
PRPs.  The Japanese PRP, as an ex-ante measure, can be, and is 
often, adopted by firms even when no specific threat has surfaced.111  
In this regard, it bears some superficial resemblance to the U.S.’ 
“clear-day” poison pill, which refers to “pills that are adopted in a 
purely preemptive way (and not in response to any particular threat 
like a hostile tender offer, or the disclosure by an investor that the 
investor has acquired a significant block of the firm’s shares).”112  
Nevertheless, referring to PRPs as “Japanese poison pills” risks 
obscuring several critical differences. 
First, it bears repeating that the modern Japanese PRP is all but 
completely untested in court.  Numerous questions remain 
unresolved with any reasonable degree of certainty by a body of 
jurisprudence or binding government regulation.113  What terms are 
permissible and what are not in the PRP?  Which corporate organ or 
organs has or have the sole or shared authority to adopt a PRP?  
What exact corporate formalities and procedures must be followed 
when implementing or triggering a PRP?  What are the respective 
roles played by the board, independent directors, special 
committees, and the shareholder body during the initial adoption or 
renewal process?  How about when the PRP is to be triggered?  In 
contrast, a large volume of litigation over U.S. poison pills in the 
Delaware courts over the last three decades has led to a 
comparatively much clearer, if sometimes shifting, understanding 
 
 110 Compare Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC) 
(appeal taken from New South Wales) 832 (“substantial or primary purpose”), 835 
(“substantial purpose”) (Lord Wilberforce) with Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas 
plc [2015] UKSC 71, [2016] 1 BCLC 1 [22] (preferring a “but-for” test by which an act 
would be invalidated only if the discretionary power to perform that act would not 
have been exercised but for the improper purpose) (Lord Sumption JSC with whom 
Lord Hodge JSC agreed), and with [51]-[54] (Lord Mance JSC with whom Lord 
Neuberger PSC agreed) (declining to take a firm position in the absence of full 
argument). 
 111 See, e.g., Fujimoto et al. (2008), infra note 154, at 46 fig. 9 (reporting that only 
8.2% of respondents cited share-ownership by activist funds as the reason for 
adopting a defensive measure). 
 112 Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills (NYU School 
of Law Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No 16-33, Sept 27, 
2016), at 3 n.1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836223 [https://perma.cc/QUF9-
8MM8] (defining the “clear-day” poison pill). 
 113 In this regard, the Takeover Guidelines, although produced under the 
sponsorship of two government ministries, cannot be considered binding 
regulation—not least because it is expressly meant not to be.  See also Takeover 
Guidelines, supra note 44, at 3. 
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within the business and legal community about the device’s legal 
function.  Crucially, the jurisprudence is clear that a U.S. board can 
unilaterally put a pill in place and thereby gain the power for 
practical intents and purposes to “just say no,” regardless of how the 
shareholders might vote.114  
Second, there is a difference, if not in law, then in the spirit of 
anti-takeover defensive measures.  Shareholder approval115 plays a 
major role in PRP practice.  For some years now, an overwhelming 
majority of PRPs are adopted with some form of shareholder vote.116  
Shareholder involvement is also significant when triggering an 
adopted PRP.  As of 2018, less than 30% of all PRPs in force can be 
unilaterally triggered by the board of directors or a board committee 
entirely without shareholder approval.117  The remaining 
supermajority—over 70%—involves shareholders in the decision-
making process in some way.  Perhaps surprisingly,118 about 10% of 
all PRPs make shareholder approval a necessary condition to 
 
 114 See supra note 23. 
 115 A shareholder vote can be either a precatory (advisory) resolution of the 
shareholder meeting, or a resolution of the shareholder meeting within the meaning 
of the Companies Act.  Mori Hamada Matsumoto, supra note 82, at 797. 
 116 For example, in 2011, only 17 PRPs were adopted solely by authority of the 
board, whereas 500 received shareholder approval or ratification; in 2018, the 
respective figures were 7 and 376.  Recof M&A MARR, infra note 155, at 33; see also 
Fujimoto et al. (2008), infra note 154, at 50 & fig 14 (reporting that out of 570 firms 
with defensive measures in place, only 15 (2.6%) adopted a defensive measure with 
only a board resolution; another 13 (2.3%) bundled the defensive measure question 
together with resolutions to appoint directors; all the rest (95.1%) sought a clear 
shareholder mandate), 51 & fig 15 (reporting that out of 136 firms, 107 (78.7%) put 
the renewal of an expiring defensive measure to a shareholder vote, another 11 
(8.1%) bundled the issue with director election, and only 18 (13.2%) did not seek 
any shareholder vote); the leading scholar on defensive measures in Japan argues 
that an efficient PRP is one that may be triggered by the board if and only if 
authorized ex ante by the shareholder meeting.  Tanaka Wataru (田中亘), Tekitai-teki 
Baishū ni Taisuru Bōeisaku ni tsuite no Oboegaki (ni kan) (敵対的買収に対する防衛策
についての覚書（二・完） [A Memorandum on Defensive Measures Against Hostile 
Takeovers (Part 2 of 2)], 131 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI (民商法雑誌) 800, 828, 833 (2005). 
 117 As of 31 October 2018, of the 383 PRPs in place, 110 (28.7%) could be 
triggered by a decision of the board or a board committee (“torishimariyaku-kai kettei-
gata” PRPs); the respective figures as of 31 December 2017 were 125 out of 405 PRPs 
(29.6%); 31 December 2016, 153 out of 443 PRPs (34.5%): Recof M&A MARR, infra 
note 155, at 33. 
 118 Writing before PRPs took recognizably modern form, Tanaka considered a 
shareholder approval requirement at the point of triggering to be unnecessary and 
possibly inefficient.  Tanaka, supra note 116, at 824, 826. 
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trigger.119  The rest—an absolute majority of all PRPs—adopt a 
“compromise” model where shareholder approval would be sought 
where this is deemed necessary.120 
Given that shareholder participation in both adoption and 
execution of a PRP is the norm in Japan today, it seems fair to say 
that shareholders continue to be the lynchpin of the PRP system.  As 
a result of the absence of clear, legally-binding guidance on the 
legality and operation of PRPs, PRPs do not axiomatically shift the 
balance of power from one organ to another.  Rather, they merely 
reflect—and at most, mildly reinforce—the pre-existing balance of 
power between shareholders and the board.  By contrast, U.S. law, 
which has always focused on the board’s authority to implement 
and trigger poison pills,121 places considerably less emphasis on 
shareholder involvement than Japan as a matter of law. 
The analysis above in this Part has shown how Japanese 
“defensive measures” and the relevant jurisprudence, whether of 
the post-bid ex-post or the pre-bid ex-ante variety, bear no more 
than a passing resemblance to their purported counterparts in the 
U.K. and the U.S..  The primary purpose rule that applies to ex-post 
defensive measures differs from the U.K. proper purposes duty in 
scope, and Japan does not have anything resembling the clear no-
frustration rule of the U.K.’s City Code.  In contrast to the well-
tested, and demonstrably lethal, U.S. poison pill, Japanese PRPs 
remain an unknown variable. 
Japan’s unique suite of defensive measures is not the only thing 
that is different from the more familiar Anglo-American world.  
There is a history of successful hostile takeovers in the U.S..122  By 
contrast, whether before or after the tumultuous events of the mid-
2000s, not a single hostile takeover attempt succeeded in Japan—but 
why?  The answer to this question, dubbed the “Enigma” of hostile 
takeovers in Japan,123 cannot be found by looking only at the law 
and practice of Japan’s legally-untested defensive measures.  To 
 
 119 As of 31 October 2018, 39 of 383 PRPs (10.2%) fall into this category 
(“kabunushi ishi kakunin-gata”); as of 31 December 2017, it was 39 of 405 (9.63%); 31 
December 2016, 43 of 443 (9.71%).  Id. 
 120 As of 31 October 2018, 234 of 383 PRPs (61.1%) are “secchū-gata”; 31 
December 2017, 241 of 405 (59.5%); 31 December 2016, 247 of 443 (55.8%).  Id. 
 121 For Delaware jurisprudence, see Part 1 above. 
 122 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: 
How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 855-56 (1999) 
(tracking hostile bids and their success rates from 1988 to 1998). 
 123 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3. 
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solve this puzzle, the next Part investigates the broader corporate 
governance and cultural context surrounding Japan’s non-existent 
hostile takeover market.  
3. MEDICINE DOESN’T CURE YOU WHEN YOU AREN’T SICK: 
JAPANESE CULTURAL NORMS, THE NON-EXISTENT HOSTILE 
TAKEOVER MARKET, AND THE SO-CALLED “PILL” 
It is a truth universally acknowledged in American scholarship 
that a jurisdiction in possession of a highly dispersed stock market 
must be in want of hostile takeovers124—at least it was, until the 
scholars met Japan.  It is well known that stock ownership in Japan’s 
listed corporations have for a long time been characterized as 
amongst the most highly dispersed in the world.125  A further 
distinctive feature of listed corporations in Japan was the abundance 
of targets seemingly ripe for takeovers, with bust-up values often 
exceeding market capitalization.126  Scholars and pundits alike have 
long proceeded on the rarely challenged assumption that the United 
Kingdom and Delaware—the world’s two most active hostile 
takeover markets—served as the model for Japan’s regulatory 
environment and capital markets.127  This combination of widely 
dispersed stock ownership, low price-to-book values, and 
regulation ostensibly based on hostile-takeover-oriented models 
seemingly distinguish Japan as one of the most hostile takeover-
friendly jurisdictions in the world. 
Reality, however, is quite another story:  hostile M&A in 
contemporary Japan remains squarely in the realm of theory and 
fiction.128  Not a single hostile takeover has ever succeeded in 
Japan.129  The persistent failure of would-be hostile acquirers in what 
 
 124 Armour et al., supra note 88, at 221-22 (“Internationally, hostile takeovers 
are a rare phenomenon, occurring with any frequency in only a handful of 
countries.  They are rare because they can only take place in companies with 
dispersed stock ownership, themselves something of a rarity internationally.”) 
 125 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 5 (“only shareholders in the 
United Kingdom and United States are as dispersed as in Japan”). 
 126 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 5-6, 13-14. 
 127 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 22-38. 
 128 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 6, 14. 
 129 We define a successful hostile takeover as one where 1) the bid is 
unsolicited and actively opposed by incumbent management; 2) the bid satisfies the 
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should have been a “hostile takeovers utopia”130—even before the 
advent of as-yet legally questionable defensive measures—is 
another example of Japanese exceptionalism.  To crack this enigma, 
two features of Japan’s corporate landscape offer valuable clues. 
First, the conventional wisdom that dispersed shareholding 
facilitates hostile takeovers breaks down in Japan.  Shareholding in 
Japanese firms may be dispersed, but not all dispersed shareholders 
are created equal.  Japanese firms are dominated by a subset of 
dispersed shareholders known in the literature as “stable 
shareholders.”131  Stable shareholders are sympathetic “insider(s)” 
 
mandatory bid rule trigger (i.e. aimed at acquiring at least two-thirds of the 
company’s shares); 3) the bid achieves its objectives; and 4) the bidder replaces 
incumbent senior management, including the board.  This excludes management-
initiated leveraged buyouts (MBOs) and partial offers in which the bidder intended 
only to secure a less than two-thirds’ stake in the company.  For a concise 
explanation of the Japanese mandatory bid rule, see Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra 
note 3, at 24-25. 
There is no consensus among observers identifying any single case as a successful 
hostile takeover.  Cf. Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness: Japanese 
Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
195, 200, 232-50 (describing various hostile attempts and the controversy over 
whether they may be classified as successful) with Dōi-nai Baishū, Kabunushi Kyōkan 
Hirogaru-ka / Tekitai-teki TOB, Sukunai Seikōrei (同意ない買収、株主共感広がるか 
敵対的TOB、少ない成立例) [Acquisitions Without Consent—Gaining Shareholder 
Sympathy? The Few Successful Examples of Hostile Tender Offer Bids], 毎日新聞 
[MAINICHI SHIMBUN] (Feb. 7, 2019), https://mainichi.jp/articles/
20190207/k00/00m/020/257000c [https://perma.cc/T5UB-Z6YF] (last visited Feb. 
11, 2019) (listing only SSP Co., Ltd. and Solid Group Holdings as the only two 
successful takeovers).  However, even these two exceptional examples do not fit 
our definition.  The 2000 bid for SSP Co., Ltd. was not opposed by the board and 
the few successful examples of unsolicited acquisitions were not by open bid, but 
rather on-market purchases.  Fujinawa Ken’ichi (藤縄憲一), Tekitai-teki Baishū to 
Taikō-saku wo meguru Giron ni tsuite (敵対的買収と対抗策を巡る議論について) [On 
the Debate Surrounding Hostile Acquisitions and Their Countermeasures], RIETI (Feb. 
13, 2006), https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/bbl/06021301.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4L7-9237].  The 2007 successful hostile bid for Solid Group 
Holdings (now CARCHS Holdings) by Ken Enterprise was not for all outstanding 
shares, but only up to 66.58% (under the two-thirds mandatory bid triggering 
threshold) and succeeded because Lehmann Brothers tendered its 48% stake.  See 
Ken Entāpuraizu no Soriddo Gurūpu HD e no Tekitai-teki TOB Seiritsu (ケン・エンタ
ープライズのソリッドグループＨＤへの敵対的ＴＯＢ成立) [Ken Enterprise’s 
Hostile Tender Offer Bid for Solid Group Holdings Succeeds], REUTERS JAPAN (Dec. 13, 
2007), https://jp.reuters.com/article/idJPJAPAN-29348620071213 
[https://perma.cc/TS37-VACQ].  For discussion on the recent Itochu bid for 
Descente, see Section 4.3 below.  
 130 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 8.  
 131 See Paul Sheard, Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance, in THE 
JAPANESE FIRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 310, 314, 318 (Masahiko Aoki & 
Ronald Dore eds., 1994). 
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that generally refrain from taking action detrimental to the 
incumbent management132 because of their existing business 
relationships with the company.  As the Livedoor and Bull-Dog Sauce 
cases133 powerfully illustrate, stable shareholders have on multiple 
occasions given hostile acquirers pause by rallying in support of 
incumbent management,134 even when doing so came at a direct 
financial cost to themselves.135  Although Japan’s cross-shareholding 
structure has come partly unwound in recent years and foreign 
investment has increased, leading Japanese scholars have observed 
that these changes primarily affected large public corporations.136  
By contrast, small- and medium-sized listed corporations that are 
favored targets for activist shareholders continue to maintain low 
 
 132 Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate 
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203, 209 n.19 (1998) 
(defining a “stable shareholder” as one who “agrees not to sell the shares to third 
parties unsympathetic to incumbent management, particularly hostile takeover 
bidders or bidders trying to accumulate strategic parcels of shares: agrees, in the 
event that disposal of the shares is necessary, to consult the firm or at least give 
notice of its intention to sell”); see also Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 17 
(“stable-shareholders generally consist of banks, insurance companies, or other 
non-financial Japanese companies that are ‘typically engaged in some sort of 
business transaction with the issuer corporation.’”).  
 133 See Discussion at Section 2.1. 
 134 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 18 (“When faced with a hostile 
takeover bid with a significant premium, stable-shareholders have little incentive 
to sell their shares given that they are not looking to reap capital gains through their 
shareholding.”).  
 135 This is especially so in the Bull-Dog Sauce case.  See Gen Goto, Legally 
“Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 143 
(2014) (noting that given the irrational behavior of individual shareholders voting 
for the management’s defensive measure, “it seems logical to conclude that they 
had strong sympathy for the targeted corporation and antipathy to the hostile 
bidder”). 
 136 Id. at 145-46; see Miyajima Hideaki & Nitta Keisuke, Kabushiki shoyū kōzō no 
tayōka to sono kiketsu—Kabushiki mochiai no kaishō / “fukkatsu” to kaigai tōshika no 
yakuwari (株式所有構造の多様化とその帰結―株式持ち合いの解消・「復活」と海
外投資家の役割) [Diversification of Share-Ownership Structure and its Consequences / 
Unwinding and “Revival” of Cross-Shareholdings and the Role of Foreign Investors], in 
NIHON NO KIGYŌ TŌCHI (日本の企業統治) [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN] 135 
(Miyajima Hideaki ed., 2011) (reporting that foreign institutional investors tended 
to prefer 1) large scale firms with 2) a larger proportion of revenue deriving from 
overseas sales, 3) high return on assets, and 4) low leverage); see also Hideaki 
Miyajima & Fumiaki Hiroki, The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan:  Causes, 
Effects, and Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 79, 86-88 (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory 
Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima eds., 2007) (foreign institutional investors began 
investing in Japanese stocks after their prices fell in the wake of the burst of the 
asset bubble). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/3
2020] Land of the Falling “Poison Pill” 723 
foreign ownership and relatively high cross-shareholding.137  
Beyond stable shareholders, incumbent management also appears 
to enjoy support from other investors,138 and even foreign 
shareholders may be reluctant to challenge the status quo.139  At least 
for now, the long-standing antipathy for hostile takeovers shared by 
management and stable shareholders140 provides  Japanese firms 
with a powerful defense against hostile takeover attempts.  Japan’s 
unique corporate culture141 means that its dispersed shareholder 
landscape does not axiomatically render Japanese corporations in 
general more vulnerable to hostile takeovers. 
A second feature is lifetime employee-dominated senior 
management,142 which historically also included large corporate 
boards.143  The especially potent combination of economic and 
 
 137 Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 146 (discussing activist hedge funds); see also 
Tanaka Wataru (田中亘), Kabushiki hoyū kōzō to kaisha-hō—Bunsan hoyū no jyōjyō 
gaisha no jirenma wo koete (株式保有構造と会社法―「分散保有の上場会社のジレン
マ」を超えて) [Shareownership Structure and Corporate Law—Beyond the “Dilemma of 
Dispersed Listed Corporations”], 2007 SHŌJI HŌMU 30, 31-32 (2013). 
 138 Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 142-43; see also John Buchanan, Dominic H. 
Chai & Simon Deakin, Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Fund Activism in 
Japan, SOCIO-ECON. REV. 15 (Feb. 12, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy007 
[https://perma.cc/GF32-86DV] (“Additionally, most Japanese investors tolerate 
great management autonomy up to the point that managers prove themselves 
clearly inadequate.”). 
 139 JOHN BUCHANAN ET AL., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN:  THE LIMITS OF 
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 213-24 (2012); Maddison Marriage, Foreign Investors Fear 
Holding Japan Inc to Account, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/
content/080fd530-a7fe-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb83.  
 140 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction:  The Evolution of Nonlegal 
Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2100 (2001) 
(suggesting that in an earlier era when corporate law did not offer the flexibility 
necessary for the development of defensive measures, “a social norm denigrating 
hostile takeovers as unethical could operate as a low-cost substitute for an extensive 
system of formal ground rules for M&A activity and as a complement to the 
structural obstacle posed by cross-shareholding practices”). 
 141 Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 41. 
 142 On the role of lifetime employment in Japanese corporate governance 
generally, see Časlav Pejović, Changes in Long-term Employment and Their Impact on 
the Japanese Economic Model: Challenges and Dilemmas, 37 J. JAPAN. L. 51, 66-68 (2014). 
 143 Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A 
Comparison of Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510, 517, 520 (1994) 
(reporting, based on a survey of 119 large Japanese companies from 1980 to 1988, 
that 21.63 out of the 22.49 directors on average are “insider directors” with either 
previous or current experience as an executive of the firm); Dan W. Puchniak, Why 
Investor Trust (and Not the Law) Matters: Japanese Lifetime Employment’s Role as a Non-
Legal Mechanism for Credible Investor Trust (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318953&download=yes) [https://perma.cc/SU3U-LBT5] 
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emotional incentives for lifetime employees of firms in virtually 
every industry to maintain control over their companies regardless 
of external pressure has proved to be a formidable barrier to the 
development of an active market in hostile takeovers.144  Although 
not impervious to pressure, Japan’s lifetime employee system has 
remained remarkably resilient despite the changing business 
environment.145  While lifetime employment is arguably not the 
main obstacle to hostile takeovers in Japan, it remains an influential 
factor that has caused Japan’s market for corporate control to evolve 
in an entirely different direction from the U.S. or U.K.146 
In any event, as noted above (in Section 2.3), defensive measures 
do not substantially shift the balance of power between corporate 
boards and shareholders.  They capture and, at best, lightly reinforce 
the balance of power as it stood at the time the PRP was adopted or 
last renewed.  The term-limited nature of most PRPs prevents their 
use as a means of effective entrenchment of any state of affairs for 
too long a period.  So long as the interests of shareholders (especially 
 
(unpublished LL.D. dissertation chapter, Kyushu University) 15 (“A system of 
internal promotion for career employees, which extends to the board of directors, 
means that career employees dominate the senior management and boards of large 
Japanese companies.”); Miyajima Hideaki (宮島英昭) & Nitta Keisuke (新田敬祐), 
Nihon-gata Torishimariyaku-kai no Tagen-teki Shinka: Sono Kettei Yōin to Pafōmansu 
Kōka (日本型取締役会の多元的進化：その決定要因とパフォーマンス効果) [Multi-
faceted Evolution of Japanese-Style Corporate Boards: Determinants and Effects on 
Performance], in KIGYŌ TŌCHI NO TAYŌKA TO TENBŌ (企業統治の多様化と展望) 
[DIVERSIFICATION AND PROSPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 40 fig. 2-4 (Kanda 
Hideki (神田秀樹) & Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan (財務省
財務総合政策研究所) eds., Kin’yū Zaisei Jijō Kenkyūkai 2007) (reporting that the 
average number of directors in companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange fell from 18.50 in 1993 to 10.37 in 2004, and for the Second Section 
from 11.74 to 8.16 over the same period).  However, there has been a slight reversal 
of late, with the average number of directors falling to a low of 8.61 and 6.88 in 2014 
for the First and Second Sections respectively before rebounding to 9.29 and 7.73 
respectively in 2016.  See Tokyo Exchange Inc., TSE-Listed Companies White Paper on 
Corporate Governance 2017 (Mar. 2017), 75 chart 57, https://www.jpx.co.jp/
english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/b5b4pj000001nj2x.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6D6L-82BE]. 
 144 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 38-41.  For a slightly tongue-
in-cheek explanation by a leading Japanese attorney on how dire the fate of a senior 
executive of a Japanese firm ousted in a hostile takeover would be as compared to 
their American counterpart, see Fujinawa, supra note 129 (discussing differences 
between Japanese and American senior executives in terms of expected life 
outcomes). 
 145 For an extensive study canvassing a wide range of quantitative and non-
quantitative studies, see Sayuri A. Shimoda, Time to Retire: Is Lifetime Employment in 
Japan Still Viable?, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 753 (2016); see also Pejović, supra note 142. 
 146 See Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 3, at 41. 
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stable-shareholders) remain aligned with that of the lifetime 
employee-dominated management, shareholders will ultimately do 
the right thing by not giving in to the invading barbarian.  In such 
situations, the legal validity of the company’s PRP will be of little 
consequence. 
A clear appreciation of the social, cultural, and legal context not 
only explains why the expected wave of hostile takeovers never 
materialized in the mid-2000s, but also arguably how Japanese firms 
were more than equipped to fend off hostile takeover attempts even 
in the absence of a “poison pill.”  This leaves us with one more 
puzzle:  if the conditions were such that hostile takeovers were never 
going to pose a clear and present danger to Japanese firms, what was 
the effect of hundreds of Japanese listed companies implementing a 
heavily watered-down and legally questionable device that they did 
not really need?   
4. CLEARING OUT THE MEDICINE CABINET:  THE SILENT DECLINE 
OF JAPAN’S SO-CALLED “PILL” 
We have seen in the two preceding Parts how Japan’s so-called 
“poison pill” is hardly that, and how the corporate governance 
environment in Japan has created natural walls that have never been 
successfully breached by barbarians, whether Japanese or American, 
at the gate.  Notwithstanding this, it is well known that hundreds of 
Japanese firms had adopted defensive measures—overwhelmingly 
of the PRP variety147—in the years immediately following the 
tumultuous mid-2000s.  But that was then; what has become of the 
Japanese “pill” since? 
In this Section, we present domestic data collated from Japanese 
language sources that have been heretofore unavailable in the 
English language literature.  The data reveals two distinct but 
sustained trends.  First, after an initial boom, new adoptions of 
defensive measures fell precipitously between 2008–2010, and since 
2009–2010 has consistently hovered in the single digits.  Second, 
since at least 2014–2015, Japanese companies have been dismantling 
their defensive measures at an increasing rate. 
Since 2014–2015, one key statistic, which we call “attrition,” has 
spiked, meaning that it is increasingly likely that a defensive 
 
 147 See infra Table 1.  
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measure due to expire148 would not be renewed.  The combination 
of very few new adoptions and increasing attrition points in one 
unequivocal direction:  down.  In just under five years (from January 
1, 2014 to October 31, 2018), the number of Japanese firms with PRPs 
in place fell from 507 to 383, which is almost a quarter (24.46%).149  
Coinciding with a large number of “pills” that expired between mid-
2016 and mid-2017, these trends led to the astonishing situation in 
which 16 times as many “pills” were abolished as they were adopted 
in Japan.150 
Thus, virtually unbeknownst to those in the West who had once 
been captivated by its rise, the once-vaunted “poison pill” is 
unmistakably in decline—and has been for some time.  The next 
question must surely be:  why? We therefore set out in this Section 
what to our knowledge is the first analysis of the forces that may be 
driving the removal of the “pill” in Japanese companies.  We round 
off this Section with our view on why the PRP may, despite its 
falling trajectory, still remain a major feature of corporate 
governance in Japan. 
4.1. Trends in Adoption and Abolishment 
There is no official data on defensive measures in Japan; the best 
publicly available, up-to-date data is collected by private actors.151  
The most precise and granular data available, albeit not for the early 
years,152 on defensive measures is from a series of studies by legal 
consultants at Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited (“SMTB”)153—
one of Japan’s largest trust banks.  The studies were based on 
 
 148 Most defensive measures have a validity period of one to three years.  See 
supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra Table 1. 
 150 See Mogi & Tanino (2018), infra note 154, at 19 Fig. 1 (48 abolishments 
versus 3 adoptions). 
 151 The Tokyo Stock Exchange also collects and reports some data, but not at 
the level of granularity offered by SMTB analysts.  See, e.g., Tokyo Exchange Inc., 
supra note 143, at 28-32 (presenting data on defensive measures aggregated by 
listing categories, and divided by several metrics such as turnover, foreign 
shareholding, and size of the largest shareholder). 
 152 In particular, data coverage before 2009 is spotty. 
 153 Specifically, the “Stock Transfer Agency Business Advisory Department” 
(or, in Japanese, 証券代行コンサルティング部).  See Organization Chart, SUMITOMO 
MITSUI TRUST BANK (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.smtb.jp/tools/english/company/
organization.html [https://perma.cc/EQ4M-RMBZ].  
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SMTB’s internal analysis of disclosure documents released by 
Japanese firms—and are published annually since 2006 (save for 
2014) in Japan’s leading business law periodical, a publication that 
is widely read by both practitioners and scholars.154  Another source 
available to Japanese practitioners is the proprietary database 
(“RECOF Database”) of M&A data that is maintained by the 
company publishing the leading specialist M&A practitioner 
periodical (MARR) in Japan.155  Although it does not capture the 
same range of data as the SMTB studies, the RECOF Database is 
 
 154 The studies we drew on to compile Table 2 are: Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, 
Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The 
Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2185 SHŌJI HŌMU 
18 (2018); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵
対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against 
Hostile Takeovers], 2152 SHŌJI HŌMU 31 (2017); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki 
Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on 
Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2120 SHŌJI HŌMU 12 (2016); 
Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状
況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 2083 SHŌJI 
HŌMU 14 (2015); Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū 
Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures 
Against Hostile Takeovers], 2012 SHŌJI HŌMU 49 (2013); Fujimoto Amane, Mogi Miki 
& Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入
状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1977 
SHŌJI HŌMU 24 (2012); Fujimoto Amane, Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū 
Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of 
Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1948 SHŌJI HŌMU 13 (2011); Fujimoto 
Amane, Mogi Miki & Tanino Kōji, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対
的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against 
Hostile Takeovers], 1915 SHŌJI HŌMU 38 (2010); Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki 
Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on 
Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1877 SHŌJI HŌMU 12 (2009). 
For earlier studies, see Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū 
Jōkyō (jō) (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況〔上〕) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive 
Measures Against Hostile Takeovers (Part 1 of 2)], 1843 SHŌJI HŌMU 42 (2008); Fujimoto 
Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入
状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers], 1809 
SHŌJI HŌMU 31 (2007); Fujimoto Amane et al, Tekitai-teki Baishū Bōeisaku no Dō’nyū 
Jōkyō (敵対的買収防衛策の導入状況) [The Status on Adoption of Defensive Measures 
Against Hostile Takeovers], 1776 SHŌJI HŌMU 46 (2006).  We did not include data from 
studies published before 2009 due to incompleteness and incomparability of the 
data with subsequent studies.  No study was published to the best of our 
knowledge by the SMTB analysts in 2014, although partial unpublished data was 
obtained from Mogi Miki and Tanino Kōji, regular authors of the SMTB studies.  It 
should also be noted at the outset that minor discrepancies exist between the SMTB 
figures (or figures extrapolated therefrom) released in different years, although 
these discrepancies have no impact on the broader picture and trends. 
 155 RECOF M&A Dētābēsu (レコフM&Aデータベース) [RECOF M&A 
Database], MARR ONLINE, https://www.marr.jp/recofdb.html 
[https://perma.cc/AS2Q-VDGM] [hereinafter Recof M&A MARR]  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
728 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
useful for multi-year trends and for information specifically on 
reasons for abolishment of defensive measures.  We present data 
sourced and processed from the two sources in three separate tables 
in the Appendix, augmented by references to other sources of data 
in the description.156 
Notwithstanding considerable uncertainty then as now as to the 
legal efficacy of defensive measures, the period from 2005 to 2008 
saw a flurry of adoptions of defensive measures by Japanese firms.  
As Table 1157 shows, firms with active defensive measures grew by 
multiples each year, from just 2 at the end of 2004 to 29 in 2005, 175 
in 2006, and 409 in 2007.  According to data collected by the Daiwa 
Institute of Research,158 the number of firms with defensive 
measures peaked at 574 in August 2008.159  Since then, as Figure 1160 
and Table 1 show, the trend in the number of firms with active 
defensive measures—overwhelmingly PRPs161—has gone only one 
way:  down.162  Since 2010, PRPs have been falling by several 
percentage points each year;163 as of 31 October, 2018, the number of 
listed companies with active defensive measures is 387—a figure not 
seen since 2007.164  
 
 156 This is necessitated by the fact that the two predominant datasets cannot 
be effectively combined because of differences in reference dates and periods.  By 
presenting separately-sourced data in separate tables of overlapping content, we 
seek to paint an empirical picture of defensive measures in Japanese firms that are 
as clear and accurate as possible. 
 157 This is compiled based on M&A Kenkyūkai Hōkoku 2009, infra note 250, at 
10 Figure 1-13, 30, and Recof M&A MARR; see also infra note 250, at 33. 
 158 Daiwa Institute of Research (Daiwa Sōken) is the think tank of Daiwa 
Securities Group, a leading investment banking and financial services 
conglomerate.  See Yoriyuki Kusaki, Message, DAIWA INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH GROUP, 
https://www.dir.co.jp/english/corporate/message/president.html 
[https://perma.cc/XMY9-CJGE] (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).]. 
 159 Fujishima, supra note 48, at 2 tbl. 1. 
 160 The data for Figure 1 is sourced from Table 1. 
 161 See Table 1 (showing that since Dec. 31, 2009, no more than four or five out 
of the several hundred defensive measures in place in any given year were not 
PRPs).  As such, it is fair to say that for practical intents and purposes, PRPs are—
and have been for some time—synonymous with the modern Japanese “poison 
pill”. 
 162 See Table 1 (showing continuous decline after 31 December 2009 until 31 
October 2018); see also Table 2 (from  2008 to 31 July 2017). 
 163 Except 2009, where the change (net decrease of one PRP) was minuscule. 
 164 See Table 2 (reporting that as of July 31, 2007 and July 31, 2008, there were 
respectively 374 and 570 firms with defensive measures in place); see also Fujishima, 
supra note 48, at 2 tbl. 1 (reporting that as of November 2007, 409 firms had 
implemented defensive measures). 
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Table 2165 shows key trends in adoptions and abolishments of 
defensive measures.166  For defensive measures in force at a given 
point in time, the absolute decline in number (also available in Table 
1167) is also reflected in the corresponding decline as a percentage of 
all listed companies in Japan.168  As the net change (whether in raw 
 
 165 Table 2 is based off SMTB analyst data.  Note that the SMTB analysts do 
not reveal their exact source or scope of data beyond “tabulated by Sumitomo-
Mitsui Trust Bank from disclosure documents of each company.”  See, e.g., Mogi & 
Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32 fig. 1. 
 166 The SMTB data does not provide breakdowns for PRPs; all figures 
comprise all types of defensive measures. 
 167 Albeit with a reference date of Dec. 31 each year for Table 1, instead of July 
31 (for Table 2). 
 168 Defensive measures’ prevalence peaked at around 15% of listed companies 
in 2008.  Igusa Rei (荏草礼依), Baishū Bōeisaku Dō’nyū Jōkyō: Dō’nyū Shasū wa 10-nen 
Renzoku Genshō, Pīku-zen no 2007-nen to Dōsuijun no 405-sha ni (買収防衛策導入状況 
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figures or percentage terms) is a function of both:  (1) new adoptions 
by companies which did not already have defensive measures; and, 
(2) abolishments by companies that already had them, it is helpful 
to examine the figures separately. 
Figures for new adoptions annually are set out in Table 2 and 
graphically presented in Figure 2.  Up to 2008, a boom in defensive 
measures resulted in hundreds of new adoptions of defensive 
measures each year.169  As Figure 2 dramatically shows, the bust 
came just as quickly, with the number of defensive measures 
adopted each year falling precipitously between 2008–2010, and 
reaching and remaining in the single digits since 2009–2010.  Having 
held steady for almost a decade, this trend is by now old news in 
Japan; it would not be misleading to call this the “not-so-new” 
normal.170  Despite this, there has been scant acknowledgement of 
the sluggish state of new adoptions in the English language 
literature.171 
Details on abolishments specifically are presented in Table 3.172  
Over the course of almost five years (from 1 January 2014 to 31 
October 2018), the total, cumulative number of defensive measures 
abolished more than doubled, rising from 133 to 286, which is an 
increase of 115%.  Table 3 also classifies abolishments by cause.  A 
decade ago, as much as half of defensive measures were 
 
～導入社数は10年連続減少、ピーク前の2007年と同水準の405社に) [Anti-Takeover 
Defensive Measures: 10-Year Continuous Decline in Number of Adopting Companies to 
405 Firms, Same Level as in 2007 Pre-Peak], MARR ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.marr.jp/print/entry/8306 (drawing on data from the RECOF M&A 
database).  Note that the figure for the number of companies adopting defensive 
measures (569) in the article was as of the end of 2008, which explains the 
discrepancy with Daiwa Institute of Research’s data (574 as of August 2008).  
Fujishima, supra note 48, at 2.  Table 2 shows that the percentage of listed companies 
in Japan with defensive measures in place stagnated until around 2014, whereupon 
it entered a continuous decline, falling from 13.4% in 2014–2015 to 11.3% by 2016–
2017. 
 169 See Table 1 and Figure 1 (showing massive growth in the number of active 
PRPs from Dec. 31, 2005 through Dec. 31, 2008). 
 170 It is suggestive that for several years now, the fact that very few firms 
introduce defensive measures has not received analysis or even comment in the 
SMTB studies. 
 171 Neither earlier work by one or more of the present authors, nor the latest 
high-profile hostile takeover paper featuring Japan did so.  See Armour et al., supra 
note 88 (picking up on this). 
 172 See infra Table 3. 
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discontinued because of M&A activity.173  Since 2013, however, as 
Table 3 shows, despite occasional spikes in M&A-related 
abolishments from time to time (in 2012, 2014, and 2016), the most 
common cause of abolishment by far is non-renewal upon 
expiration.  This may be contrasted with two interesting 
observations:  (1) a defensive measure was abolished on grounds of 
failure to obtain a favorable shareholder vote only once ever, in 2014; 
and (2) management only rarely preemptively abolishes a defensive 
measure before it is due to expire.174  The dominance of abolishment 
by non-renewal suggests that while there is no compelling pressure 
on management to proactively abolish a measure while it is still in 
force, increasingly the affirmative case for renewing a measure upon 
expiration—whatever it might be for the firm in question—is not 
made out.  
However, classifying an abolishment as “non-renewal” does not 
answer the further, and perhaps even more interesting question:  
why exactly was the decision taken not to renew?  Recent data on 
shareholder resolutions pertaining to defensive measures sheds 
some light on this.  Although it was reported in 2018 that every 
resolution renewing or amending a defensive measure put to a vote 
in 128 firms within the June 2017 meeting season was successfully 
passed, in 32 firms (or 25%) the resolution received less than 70% 
shareholder approval, with at least two firms receiving less than 
55%.175 
This is consistent with the finding in another study that there has 
been a general decline in shareholder approval rates for defensive 
measure resolutions since 2013.176  The latter study further suggests 
that a reason why the decline was not even more pronounced lay in 
the fact that firms receiving low shareholder approval in the past 
have since turned to outright abolishment.177  It is thus possible that 
a substantial percentage of “non-renewal” cases might in fact have 
turned out to be “failure to obtain shareholder support” cases if 
 
 173 See Fujimoto et al. (2008), supra note 154, at 51 (reporting that 9 of the 18 
defensive measures abolished up to July 31 2008 were attributable to management 
integration (経営統合), management buyout, acquisition, or other M&A activities 
broadly defined). 
 174 See Table 2 (showing 183 of 204 (89.71%) abolishments from 2010–2011 to 
2017–2018 were by non-renewal) and Table 3 (showing a total of 7 abolishments 
before expiry for 2013–2018, versus 137 abolishments by non-renewal). 
 175 Igusa, supra note 168.  
 176 Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 33-34, 34 fig 3. 
 177 Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 34. 
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management had proceeded to put the issue to a shareholder vote.178  
Non-renewal may at times be a convenient face-saving way out for 
management who would not want to risk losing a shareholder vote 
over a defensive measure. 
The fact that non-renewal is the primary way by which a 
defensive measure is abolished has further implications for attempts 
to analyze the decline of defensive measures in Japan.  While there 
is data on the number of defensive measures (or PRPs specifically) 
abolished each year (Tables 1, 2, and 3), these figures in and of 
themselves say little about the level of support for (or opposition 
against) defensive measures in each reference period. 
Recall that defensive measures in recent years usually have a 
validity period of three years,179 and consider that a defensive 
measure, once adopted or renewed, is rarely abolished during its 
term (Table 3).  In 2013–2014, for example, all 23 abolishments were 
by non-renewal.  Hence, regardless of how much support for (or 
opposition against) a defensive measure there is in a given year, for 
practical purposes any decision as to whether a defensive measure 
has outlived its usefulness is likely to be made only when it is about 
to expire, not before.  The exact number of defensive measures 
abolished in a given reference period would turn not only on the 
mood towards defensive measures in that year, but would also 
depend on the number of defensive measures that are due to expire 
over each 12-month period—which, as Table 2 shows, varies 
considerably.  Hence, to capture a sense of the overall sentiment 
toward defensive measures, we devise the concept of “attrition 
rate,”180 by which we mean the percentage of expiring defensive 
 
 178 A concrete example of a firm deciding not to proceed with a shareholder 
vote on renewal is Fujifilm Holdings, whose proposed resolution on defensive 
measures was withdrawn by management just before the shareholder meeting of 
2013 on the ground that “it had become difficult to obtain the understanding of a 
majority of shareholders.”  Fuji firumu, baishū bōeisaku gi’an torisage / sōkai chokuzen 
ni (富士フイルム、買収防衛策議案取り下げ 総会直前に) [Fujifilm Withdraws 
Defensive Measure Proposal Right Before Shareholder Meeting], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN 
(electronic ed., June 26, 2013), https://www.nikkei.com/article/
DGXNZO56656240W3A620C1DT0000/. 
 179 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 180 Although the SMTB studies from 2009 onwards (excluding 2014) contained 
attrition and attrition rate figures in whole or in part, nothing was said about the 
significance or value of this measure, nor was the term “attrition rate” coined or 
defined as such. 
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measures that are not renewed.181  A higher attrition rate in a given 
year, regardless of the absolute number of defensive measures being 
abolished, would thus indicate either less demand for or greater 
pressure against defensive measures. 
We are able to obtain or compute attrition rate figures for the 
years from 2009 to 2018.  As Figure 2182 shows, attrition seems to 
have progressed in three phases.  First, from August 2009 to July 
2014, attrition rates held steady between 8-10%, with a one-off fall to 
just 3.61% for the 2012–2013 period.  Since 2013–2014, attrition rates 
have soared to double-digit figures, more than doubling from 9.62% 
in 2013–2014 to 20.66% just three years later (2016–2017) and rising 
further to 22.60% (2017–2018).  The confluence of a high attrition 
rate, a large number of expiring defensive measures, and an 
exceptionally low number of new adoptions in 2016–2017 led to one 
astonishing statistic:  for every firm that introduced defensive 
measures, 16183 abolished184 them. 
  
 
 181 This measure is only made possible by SMTB analyst data, which tracks 
the number of expiring measures and the number of which that are renewed or not 
renewed from 2009 onwards. 
 182 Data for Figure 2 is from Table 2. 
 183 Mogi & Tanino (2018), supra note 154, at 19 tbl. 1 (reporting that defensive 
measures were abolished in 48 firms but introduced in only three in the 12-month 
period ending July 31, 2017).  Cf. Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32 tbl. 1 
(reporting that defensive measures were abolished in 45 firms).  The discrepancy 
between the 2017 and 2018 studies is resolved in favor of the latter.  The respective 
adoption/abolishment ratio was 1:5 for 2015–2016 and 1:2.875 for 2014–2015. 
 184 Following Mogi & Tanino, we do not distinguish between “abandonment” 
(in which the management pro-actively dismantles the defensive measure), 
“expiry” (in which a term-limited defensive measure is allowed to expire without 
renewal), or where the defensive measure has become “defunct” (where the firm 
has undergone M&A or delisted).  See, e.g., Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 
31. 
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Although the exceptional adoption/abolishment ratio of 2016–
2017 is a one-off event, the attrition rate has continued to rise.  For 
the 2017–2018 period, only 115 defensive measures expired,185 
presenting a substantially smaller pool of defensive measures 
coming up for a decision as to renewal or abolishment as compared 
to 213 for the 12 months  ending on July 31, 2017 and 171 for the 12 
months ending on July 31, 2016 (Table 2).  Even though the raw 
attrition figure fell from 44 in 2016–2017 to just 27 in 2017–2018, the 
attrition rate has nonetheless increased from 20.66 to 22.60%.  Given 
the trend of rising attrition rates and the fact that a substantially 
larger number of defensive measures are likely to expire in the near 
 
 185 Igusa, supra note 168 (reporting that 104 defensive measures would expire 
during calendar year 2018). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
50
100
150
200
250
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
201
6
201
7
201
8
at
tri
tio
n 
ra
te
 (%
)
no
. o
f m
ea
su
re
s
year
Fig. 2   Adoption, Abolishment, and Attrition of Defensive 
Measures, 2009–2018
new adoptions
abolishments (all causes)
attrition
attrition rate (%)
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/3
2020] Land of the Falling “Poison Pill” 735 
future—and hence prompt a management decision to let the 
measure lapse or seek a shareholder mandate to renew—attrition 
data of the next two to three years will be crucial.  The tipping point 
at which defensive measures go from an institution in decline to just 
another colorful concluded chapter in the history of corporate 
governance may very well lay just over the horizon. 
In sum, the confluence of two trends—prolonged slump in the 
number of new adoptions and an increasing attrition rate—
represent a sea change in the Japanese hostile takeover landscape so 
significant that it is surprising that it has thus far escaped entirely 
any detailed comparative analysis, or even notice in the Western-
language literature.  Remedying this lapse is the aim of Section 4.2. 
4.2. Explaining the Fall in Defensive Measures 
The developments described in the preceding Section—which 
seemingly renders Japanese firms ripe once again for hostile 
takeovers—cries for an explanation:  why is this happening?  In this 
Section, we offer three explanations: (1) Japanese boards no longer 
consider defensive measures to be necessary to counter the threat of 
hostile takeovers; (2) the PRP has had a de minimis effect on Japanese 
corporate governance; and (3) corporate governance changes such 
as the Corporate Governance Code and the new disclosure 
requirements in Japan’s revised Stewardship Code have increased 
institutional investor resistance against renewal of expiring PRPs.  
We examine each of these in turn. 
1. PRPs ceased to be necessary as hostile takeovers ceased to be a 
threat (“Necessity Explanation”). 
Let us assume that PRPs are theoretically, or are at least 
perceived to be, effective countermeasures to hostile takeovers.186  
An obvious explanation for falling demand for a medicine would be 
decreased incidence of the disease the medicine is meant to treat; in 
the PRP’s case, that would be hostile takeovers. 
 
 186 For why this perception is, with the benefit of hindsight, difficult to justify 
today, see Section 2.3 above (explaining why the PRP is of questionable 
effectiveness as a matter of law) and Section 4.2 below. 
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The collapse in new demand for defensive measures (i.e. new 
adoptions) since 2009187 fits particularly well with the Necessity 
Explanation.  Much of the initial demand for defensive measures, 
fueled by the turbulent events of the mid-2000s, was quickly 
exhausted; by 2009, a substantial percentage of Japan’s leading firms 
had PRPs and other defensive measures in place.188  In the years that 
followed, the wave of hostile takeovers anticipated in the mid-2000s 
(and before) never materialized in Japan.189  Reduced pressure on 
Japanese firms by investment funds in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis has been linked to the drastic drop in new adoptions 
in 2008–2009.190  In recent years, activist investors such as hedge 
funds have also moved away from acquiring large blocks of shares 
with a view to eventually gaining corporate control via tender offers.  
Rather, hedge funds have increasingly favored smaller 
shareholdings and other forms of engagement with investee 
firms.191  By turning away from outright acquisition (hostile or 
otherwise), this shift in investor behavior also suppressed new 
demand for anti-takeover defensive measures in firms that were not 
early adopters.  Trends in new adoptions of defensive measures, 
which fell off a cliff around 2008–2009 to just 21 (from 207 in the 
previous reference period),192 and thereafter languished in the single 
digits,193 reflect these changes in the perceived necessity of PRPs. 
The calculus involved in adopting a defensive measure for the 
first time is straightforward:  if it is necessary and the cost is 
affordable, do it.  It is certainly possible that a defensive measure, 
which was at the time of initial adoption deemed necessary by 
management, would later be re-assessed as unnecessary and 
accordingly abolished.  Considerations of necessity, however, do not 
 
 187 See Table 2, Figure 2. 
 188 Id. (noting that by 2009, demand has levelled off with about 24% of 
companies with premium listings (on the First Sections) having implemented 
defensive measures). 
 189 For reasons why this was so, see Part 3. 
 190 See Fujimoto et al. (2009), supra note 154, at 12 (reporting that only 21 
defensive measures were adopted in 2008–2009, a sharp decrease from 207 in 2007–
2008). 
 191 Ishii Yūsuke, Kawaru Kabunushi Sōkai (変わる株主総会) [The Changing 
Shareholder Meeting], in KAWARU KABUNUSHI SŌKAI (変わる株主総会) [THE 
CHANGING SHAREHOLDER MEETING] 23 (Mori Hamada & Matsumoto ed. 2018).  For 
recent work on hedge fund activism in Japan, see Buchanan, Chai & Deakin, supra 
note 138. 
 192 See Table 2; Figure 2. 
 193 Id. 
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necessarily manifest in the same way when a firm’s management is 
deciding if an expiring defensive measure should be renewed,194 or 
if an existing defensive measure should be abolished proactively 
before it expires. 
As lived experience (or just common sense) tells us, just because 
something becomes factually unnecessary does not mean that 
people would axiomatically cease to do it or actively get rid of it;195 
they may simply hold on to the thing and just do nothing with it.  In 
the face of path dependence and switching costs,196 loss of necessity 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale abandonment 
of defensive measures.  Although, as noted above, there has been no 
abolishment of defensive measures en masse pre-expiry,197 attrition 
rates (i.e. percentage of defensive measures not renewed upon 
expiry) have increased sharply from 2015 onwards.198  As the 
Necessity Explanation is, by itself, unable to account for rising 
attrition, we revisit the attrition trend below (at 4.2.3).  In the 
meantime, recall that the Necessity Explanation is premised on the 
PRP as a necessary, or at least a somewhat useful, device.  But does 
this premise really hold—and what happens if it does not? 
2. The PRP’s effect on Japanese corporate governance is de minimis 
(“Legal Irrelevance Explanation”). 
Initial hopes that the PRP would serve as a potent anti-takeover 
defense may have justified their initial adoption on grounds of 
“necessity” in the early years.  With the passage of time, however, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to make the same case for the PRP.  
 
 194 Most, although not all, defensive measures are valid for a fixed term; see 
supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 195 A simple analogy will suffice:  is there not at least one person you know 
(or yourself) who keeps old medicine around, even when the illness it was meant 
to treat was cured or never came to pass? 
 196 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 9-14 (Jeffrey N. Gordon 
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (discussing path dependence and barriers to 
changes in corporate governance); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69-113 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe 
eds., 2004); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence and 
Complementarity in Corporate Governance, in Gordon & Roe, id. at 114-27. 
 197 At Section 4.1; see supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 198 Table 2; Figure 2. 
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We have established199 that the modern Japanese PRP is nothing like 
the mature, potent, and binding legal instrument that is the U.S. 
poison pill; it remains a legally untested construct whose legitimacy 
appears to hinge on shareholder support.  In contrast with the 
“shadow pill” effect of the U.S. poison pill that protects every listed 
company in the U.S. regardless of whether a pre-bid “clear-day” 
poison pill is in place,200 it is far from clear whether the PRP, when 
put to the test, will be even worth the paper it is written on.  Japan’s 
PRP is, at best, “a shadow of a shadow.” 
That is not to say that just because the PRP is (or likely to be) of 
little utility in a real hostile acquisition, it is also ipso facto a 
deleterious feature of corporate governance.  As discussed above (at 
Section 2.3), the PRP does not substantially shift power from the 
shareholder meeting to the board; it reflects the balance of power 
existing at the time of adoption or renewal, and (at best) mildly 
reinforces it for the duration of the PRP.  Based on the best 
information available to us now, PRPs would be most accurately 
characterized as inconsequential and irrelevant features of Japanese 
corporate governance.   
The Legal Irrelevance Explanation accounts for the sluggish 
demand for new adoptions over the past nine years.  There is 
generally no compelling reason for a firm to adopt a PRP, given that 
the board and supportive shareholders are capable of fending off 
hostile takeovers on their own—and especially if the financial or 
political cost is substantial.  Conversely, there is no urgent need for 
management to abolish existing PRPs if holding on to them does 
little harm.  Rising attrition rates over the past four or so years, 
therefore, cannot be attributed entirely to the Legal Irrelevance 
Explanation.  The final, critical question is:  how did the cost side of 
the cost-benefit analysis change significantly in recent years?  This 
brings us to our third and final explanation.  
3. Corporate governance changes sparked increased institutional 
shareholder resistance to defensive measures (“Investor 
Resistance Explanation”). 
Even as successful hostile takeovers have maintained their 
absence, Japan’s corporate governance environment has nonetheless 
 
 199 Section 2.3. 
 200 Id. 
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undergone substantial changes in recent years.  Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code was first implemented in June 2015 and last 
amended in June 2018.201  Principle 1.5 provides that: 
With respect to the adoption or implementation [i.e. 
triggering] of anti-takeover measures, the board and 
kansayaku [statutory auditors] should carefully examine their 
necessity and rationale in light of their fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders, ensure appropriate 
procedures, and provide sufficient explanation to 
shareholders. 202 
Although investor discontent with defensive measures may be 
nothing new,203 coupled with growing criticism of defensive 
measures from not only foreign but also domestic institutional 
investors,204 the introduction of the Corporate Governance Code 
with this interesting feature appears to have prompted a number of 
firms to proactively abolish defensive measures.205  In this sense, 
 
 201 TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (June 1, 
2018), https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/
20180601.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEU2-ARSF].  
 202 Id. at 8. Principle 1.5 was untouched by the 2018 revision. 
 203 See, e.g., Fuji firumu, baishū bōeisaku gi’an torisage / sōkai chokuzen ni (
富士フイルム、買収防衛策議案取り下げ 総会直前に) [Fujifilm Withdraws 
Defensive Measure Proposal Right Before Shareholder Meeting], Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun (electronic ed., June 26, 2013), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNZO56656240W3A620C1DT0000/ 
[https://perma.cc/AD94-PG87] (reporting that both domestic and foreign 
institutional investors increasingly object to defensive measures on the grounds 
that they lead to managerial self-preservation); Kawasaki Kisen nado 19 sha, 
bōeisaku wo haishi, konnendo, 479 sha wa nao keizoku (川崎汽船など１９社、買
収防衛策を廃止、今年度、４７９社はなお継続。) [19 Firms Including Kawasaki 
Kisen Abolish Defensive Measures; 479 Firms Continue to Have Them]; Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 13 (morning ed., June 12, 2015) (noting that strong investor dissatisfaction 
with defensive measures has been present since before the Corporate Governance 
Code took effect). 
 204 See ”Kawareru kakugo” de kau—bōeisaku haishi, tōshika wa kangei (「買われる覚
悟」を買う――防衛策廃止、投資家は歓迎) [Buying with the “Readiness to be 
Bought”—Investors Welcome Abolishment of Defensive Measures] NIHON KEIZAI 
SHIMBUN, 18 (morning ed., May 24, 2017) (also reporting that outside [comparable 
to independent] directors with management expertise have increased, and there 
have been cases in which such directors advise abolishment of defensive measures). 
 205 See Kawasaki Kisen nado 19 sha, bōeisaku wo haishi, konnendo, 479 sha wa nao 
keizoku (川崎汽船など１９社、買収防衛策を廃止、今年度、４７９社はなお継続
。) [19 Firms Including Kawasaki Kisen Abolish Defensive Measures; 479 Firms Continue 
to Have Them], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 13 (morning ed., June 12, 2015) (citing the 
example of Nisshinbo Holdings as a firm that had taken into consideration the 
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changes in the corporate governance environment have made it 
easier for institutional investors to express—either through or 
beyond voting at shareholder meetings—their own, possibly long-
held objections to defensive measures. 
A further development is the 2017 revision of Japan’s 
Stewardship Code, which introduced a new provision exhorting 
institutional investors to disclose their votes by individual investee 
company and by individual agenda item.206  The revision quickly 
made its impact felt:  even before the amended Code formally went 
into effect, a number of institutional investors proactively disclosed 
their past voting records.207  Japanese commentators have attributed 
the especially pronounced spike in PRP abolishments in 2017 
 
Corporate Governance Code’s coming into effect in its decision not to renew its 
PRP, but also noting that deep-seated wariness of hostile acquisition by other firms 
in the same industry have kept the number of firms taking proactive steps towards 
abolition low); see also Sōkai no shōten (10) baishū bōeisaku—hihan tsuyoku genshō keikō 
(総会の焦点（１０）買収防衛策――批判強く減少傾向。) [Shareholder Meetings 
Focus (10): Anti-Takeover Defensive Measures—Strong Criticism, Trend of Decline], 
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 15 (morning ed., June 22, 2015). 
 206 Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors, Japan’s Stewardship Code, 
(May 29, 2017), 15 at Guidance 5-3, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/
stewardship/20170529/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C44Z-WWXY] (“Institutional 
investors should at a minimum aggregate the voting records into each major kind 
of proposal, and publicly disclose them.  Furthermore, to enhance visibility of the 
consistency of their voting activities with their stewardship policy, institutional 
investors should disclose voting records for each investee company on an 
individual agenda item basis.”).  For the pre-amendment position, see Principles 
for Responsible Institutional Investors, Japan’s Stewardship Code, (Feb. 2014), 11 at 
Guidance 5-3, https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/
20140407/01.pdf, [https://perma.cc/D2X6-ZRQV] (“Institutional investors should 
aggregate the voting records into each major kind of proposal, and publicly disclose 
them.  Such a disclosure is important in making more visible the consistency of their 
voting activities with their stewardship policy.”); Gen Goto, The Logic and Limits of 
Stewardship Codes: The Case of Japan, University of Tokyo Business Law Working 
Paper Series, No 2018-E-01, 45-47 (Oct. 2018), http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/wp-
content/uploads/sites/10/2018/10/BLWPS2018E01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZX8-MSQ5], BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming). 
 207 See, e.g., Ema Naoyoshi (依馬 直義), Nihon-ban Suchuwādoshippu Kōdo Kaitei 
wa Kabunushi Sōkai, Giketsuken Kōshi ni Dō Eikyō Shita ka (日本版スチュワードシッ
プ・コード改訂は株主総会、議決権行使にどう影響したか) [How Did the 
Stewardship Code Revision Affect Shareholder Meetings and Exercise of Voting Rights?], 
ASAHI JUDICIARY (Aug. 15, 2017), http://judiciary.asahi.com/fukabori/
2017081100001.html [https://perma.cc/UB28-YL2S] (reporting that several 
institutional investors have already begun disclosing voting decisions by company 
and by individual resolution even before the amended Stewardship Code was 
formally promulgated). 
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(notable both in terms of attrition rate208 or percentage change209) at 
least in part to the Stewardship Code amendment on disclosure 
requirements,210 albeit without clear explanation. 
Our Investor Resistance Explanation is as follows.  Although 
institutional investors were previously free, if they so wished, to 
support management proposals for defensive measures without 
sanction or consequence,211 they are now under pressure to 
disclose—and accordingly, justify publicly—their voting decisions.  
Given that no general hostile takeover wave ever made its 
appearance in Japan for a decade, the management of a particular 
firm would be hard-pressed, absent a concrete and firm-specific 
hostile takeover threat, to state a compelling reason to maintain a 
PRP.212  Without a persuasive, affirmative reason from management, 
institutional investors would similarly find it difficult to justify 
voting in favor of renewal of expiring defensive measures. 
 
 208 See infra Table 2 (defensive measures attrition reached a high of 20.66%, 
compared to 16.96% for 2016 and 13.04% for 2015). 
 209 See infra Table 1 (total number of PRPs in force fell year-on-year by 8.58% 
in reference year 2017, compared to 6.34% for 2016 and 3.47% for 2015). 
 210 Mogi and Tanino (2017) report that of the 43 firms that voluntarily 
abolished defensive measures in reference year 2017 (i.e. excluding the two 
abolishments following from M&A activity), 10 firms had very high levels of 
institutional investor shareholding.  They speculate that the difficulty in securing 
favorable votes from institutional investors was one of the reasons for abolishment 
in these firms.  Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 154, at 32.  They further report that 
the decrease in favorable votes from domestic institutional investors in shareholder 
resolutions to approve defensive measures is attributable to the Stewardship 
Code’s new individual disclosure requirement.  Mogi & Tanino (2017), supra note 
154, at 39.  See also Mogi & Tanino (2018), supra note 154, at 23 fig. 7 (reporting 
substantial declines in the percentage of resolutions on defensive measures for 
which domestic individual investors voted in favor, and attributing that fall to the 
revised Stewardship Code). 
Although the overwhelming majority of abolishments are not as a result of an 
attempted renewal failing to garner the necessary shareholder votes in support (see 
infra Table 3, showing that the vast majority of abolishments are management-
initiated or based on management-side reasons), as observed above (in the main 
text after note 177), it is plausible—even likely—that  management would simply 
not table a defensive measure for renewal upon expiry if there was reliable 
indication that the chances of obtaining shareholder approval were less than 
extremely high.  The change triggered by the Stewardship Code’s new disclosure 
requirement may have thus not only had an effect on the voting percentages on 
defensive measures that were put to a vote, but also deterred management in firms 
dominated by institutional investors from even seeking renewal of the defensive 
measure in the first place. 
 211 As discussed in Part 3, antipathy for hostile takeovers was, at least until 
very recently, widely held by shareholders. 
 212 See supra Section 4.2. 
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The effect of the Stewardship Code revision on investor 
resistance against defensive measures is especially interesting as it 
hints at an unexpected outcome:  a stewardship code—and 
stewardship as a concept—can matter.  The notion that stewardship 
can have concrete impact on individual firms’ corporate governance 
practices runs counter to the emerging consensus among corporate 
governance scholars that stewardship codes have been largely 
ineffectual.213  For the avoidance of doubt, we stress that the Investor 
Resistance Explanation is only a tentative one, and that the results 
of the voting seasons from 2019 onwards should offer crucial 
evidence either confirming or denying the effect of disclosure 
requirement changes. 
4.3. So, What Are PRPs Good For, Anyway? 
If, as we have suggested, the PRP is unnecessary, legally 
irrelevant, and increasingly under fire from institutional investors, 
then its demise would seem inevitable.  Yet time and again, reports 
of the demise of many a thing have been greatly exaggerated;214 any 
scholar attempting to predict the future of any phenomenon should 
be appropriately circumspect.  Even as the Japanese “pill” 
seemingly drifts closer towards extinction with each year, prudence 
demands that we acknowledge that neither is such progress 
inexorable nor the final destination inevitable.  Notwithstanding the 
PRP’s many failings as a legal mechanism, it may continue to play 
at least some role in Japan’s corporate governance landscape for two 
reasons. 
First, PRPs are considerably more palatable than the 
alternatives.  One of these is cross-shareholding.  A classic215 if 
 
 213 Iris H.Y. Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the 
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1022 
(2014); Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?, 15 J. CORP. 
L. STUD. 217 (2015); Brian R. Cheffins, The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, 73 MOD. 
L. REV. 1004, 1024-25 (2010); Paul Davies, Shareholders in the United Kingdom, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 375 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. 
Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015); see also Goto (2018), supra note 206, at 50-51 
(reporting that adoption of the Stewardship Code by private pension funds in Japan 
has been underwhelming). 
 214 Paraphrasing the famous quip widely attributed to Mark Twain. 
 215 See, e.g., Juro Teranishi, Loan Syndication in War-Time Japan and the Origins 
of the Main Bank System, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR 
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controversial216 feature of Japanese corporate governance, cross-
shareholding is a system where multiple companies agree to hold 
shares in each other’s companies, resulting in a web of mutual or 
circular shareholdings.217  By locking down most of the issued shares 
of participating listed companies, cross-shareholding insulated 
incumbent management from external pressure and posed a 
formidable obstacle to hostile takeovers.218  Throughout the lost 
decade, cross-shareholdings were gradually unwound in many 
Japanese firms, although the extent and degree of this unwinding 
differs between firms.219  Unlike cross-shareholdings, which are 
difficult and costly to create and unwind, PRPs can be adopted and 
removed as and when necessary and with relative ease.  PRPs also 
offer advantages compared to other existing defensive measures.  
Compared to the sole alternative220 ex-ante measure, the trust-type 
plan, PRPs are considerably cheaper to implement and maintain.221 
Ex-post measures222 also suffer from their own drawbacks.  
Share placements to friendly stable shareholders remain a 
possibility but would require at the time of crisis either the support 
of a supermajority of shareholders, or substantial financial 
 
DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 59-61, 63-64, 78-79 (Masahiko Aoki & 
Hugh Patrick eds., Oxford University Press 1994) (tracing the early history of cross-
shareholding). 
 216 See RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM—
JAPAN AND GERMANY VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS 92-96 (Oxford University Press 
2000) (“The cross-shareholding system has never had an altogether good press in 
Japan . . . [r]ecently there has been . . . discussion of cross-holdings in the context of 
the corporate governance debate, and it is surely obvious that unless management 
stability can be shown to have some relation to shareholder value by improving 
performance or raising the share price, it is impossible to explain to shareholders 
the rationale for cross-holdings.”). 
 217 Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 210-21 (2000); Goto (2014), 
supra note 135, at 128 n12. 
 218 Shishido, supra note 217, at 208-11.  Shishido, however, also argues that 
firms stabilized by cross-shareholding are ultimately subject to capital market 
discipline as cross-shareholders would still sell their shares if corporate 
performance were to be unacceptable.  Id. at 211. 
 219 Goto (2014), supra note 135, at 144-46. 
 220 Class shares were adopted as a takeover defense around 2004, but no firm 
has adopted it since for this purpose due (at least in part) to resistance from the 
stock exchange.  KANDA HIDEKI, KAISHA-HŌ (会社法) [CORPORATE LAW] 177 (20th 
ed., Yūhihaku 2018). 
 221 See supra note 86. 
 222 See Section 2.1. 
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commitment from a supportive stable shareholder.223  A Livedoor-
type placement of share options to a particular (friendly) 
shareholder without shareholder approval is vulnerable to 
challenge in court;224 a Bull-Dog Sauce-style option allotment 
discriminating between the bidder and other shareholders would 
not succeed without both substantial shareholder support and 
considerable cost to the target company.225  In this regard, 
notwithstanding its weaknesses from a purely legal standpoint, the 
PRP remains the cheapest defense available to a Japanese listed 
company—provided it can command the necessary shareholder 
support and would survive judicial scrutiny if challenged (which, as 
explained above, is uncertain).226 
This brings us to our second point:  if hostile takeovers are ever 
perceived as a real threat again, we may expect to see a revival in 
PRPs.  Thus, to stop the PRP’s decline dead in its tracks—or spark a 
renaissance—might require no more than a single instance of a 
hostile takeover repelled by a triggered PRP, or perhaps even 
something much less drastic.  Consider the case of Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha, Ltd. (“Kawasaki Kisen”), a shipping and logistics concern, 
which announced in May 2015 that its PRP would not be renewed 
(i.e. abolished) upon expiration in June that year.227  Within just two 
months, the Singapore-based hedge fund Effissimo Capital 
 
 223 A share placement at a “particularly favorable” (特に有利な金額) price to 
the placee requires a special resolution (two-thirds) of the shareholders.  Companies 
Act, §§ 199(2), 199(3), 201(1), 309(2)(v).  Conversely, a share placement at a fair price 
may be conducted by the board without a shareholder vote (Companies Act, § 
201(1)), but would cost the placee. 
 224 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.  For a recent example where 
a share placement and option allotment by a listed company was enjoined on the 
ground that the primary purpose of the placement and allotment was to change the 
composition of the shareholder body, see Ōsaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] 
Decision, Jan. 6, 2017, 1516 Kin’yū Shōji Hanrei (金融商事判例) 51.  
 225 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. 
 226 For those that have abolished their PRPs or who foresee the loss of 
shareholder support necessary for maintaining a PRP, “contingency plans” offered 
by advisory firms may offer some comfort.  See, e.g., IR Japan, Kontinjenshī puran 
sakutei shi’en (コンティンジェンシー・プラン策定支援) [Contingency Plan 
Formulation Support], IR JAPAN (2019), https://www.irjapan.net/service/
consulting/contingency.html [https://perma.cc/2QV5-5ZCH]. 
 227 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd, Tōsha kabushiki no daikibo kaitsuke kōi ni kansuru 
taiō hōshin (baishū bōeisaku) no hi-kōshin (haishi) ni tsuite (当社株式の大規模買付行為
に関する対応方針（買収防衛策）の非更新（廃止）について) [Re the Non-Renewal 
(Abolishment) of the Company’s Policy on Large-Scale Acquisitions of Shares (Defensive 
Measures)] (May 21, 2015), https://www.kline.co.jp/ja/news/ir/ir-
6173082786920771957/main/0/link/20150521-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6M8-
UT99]. 
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Management (“Effissimo”)228 had accumulated a substantial stake in 
the firm;229 by March 2016, it had become Kawasaki Kisen’s largest 
shareholder by far230—and remains so as of November 2018.231  The 
fact that Effissimo built its dominant position in Kawasaki Kisen so 
quickly after the latter abolished its PRP appears a little too 
convenient to dismiss as mere coincidence.232  In a further, recent 
development, Effissimo officially altered its purpose of 
shareholding from “pure investment” to “to advise management 
according to the investment and the situation, and to make 
important proposals, inter alia”233—the harbinger of greater 
activism by Effissimo in the not-so-distant future.234 
 
 228 One reason Effissimo receives considerable attention in the Japanese and 
international media lies in the connection between its founders to activist investor 
Murakami Yoshiaki of the notorious (and defunct) “Murakami Fund.” See, e.g., 
Effissimo Capital becomes top shareholder of Japan’s Ricoh, Kawasaki Kisen, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 4, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/effissimo-
japan/effissimo-capital-becomes-top-shareholder-of-japans-ricoh-kawasaki-kisen-
idUKL4N11A1XA20150904 [https://perma.cc/XXJ4-6JDW]. 
 229 Effissimo made its first required filing as a major shareholder (greater than 
5%) on Sept. 4, 2015.  See Effissimo Capital Management Pte Ltd, Tairyō Hoyū 
Hōkoku-sho (大量保有報告書) [Report on Major Shareholding] 3 (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/[https://perma.cc/R9ZS-GTJD] (reporting a 
6.18% shareholding).  
 230 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Yūkashōken Hōkoku-sho (有価証券報告書) 
[Annual Securities Report] 36 (June 24, 2016), http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ 
[https://perma.cc/UK7H-498X].  
 231 As of Nov. 12, 2018, Effissimo held 38.99% of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Yonhanki Hōkokusho (四半期報告書) [Quarterly Report] 
10 (Nov. 12, 2018), http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ [https://perma.cc/462Y-
8EH5]. 
 232 See, e.g., Ōshima Shin’ichi, Kawasaki Kisen kabu no tairyō shutoku, baishū 
bōeisaku wo haishi shite inakereba chigau kekka ni? (川崎汽船株の大量取得、買収防衛
策を廃止していなければ違う結果に？) [Large-Scale Acquisition of Kawasaki Kisen 
Shares: Would the Result Have Been Different Had Its Defensive Measure Not Been 
Abolished?], Listed Company Board Member’s Governance Forum (June 28, 2016) 
(rev’d May 16, 2018), https://govforum.jp/member/news/news-news/news-
management/management-management/19667/[https://perma.cc/8SQ9-TGZ4] 
(suggesting that there is a “high possibility” that the impetus for such a rapid 
accumulation of Kawasaki Kisen shares lay in the abolishment of its PRP in 2015). 
 233 Effissimo Capital Management Pte Ltd, Henkō Hōkoku-sho No. 86 (変更報告
書 No. 86) [Report of Amendment, No. 86] 2 (Nov. 6, 2018), 
http://disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp/ [https://perma.cc/Y4K6-CR98]. 
 234 Effissimo ga Kawasaki Kisen kabu no hoyū mokuteki wo henkō (エフィッシモが
川崎汽船株の保有目的を変更) [Effissimo Amends Its Purpose for Holding Kawasaki 
Kisen Shares], IB Consulting (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ib-consulting.jp/
newspaper/310/ [https://perma.cc/JYM2-XGBX] (noting that although Effissimo 
had voted against the resolution appointing the president of Kawasaki Kisen at the 
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How Effissimo will exercise its newfound power—the 
accumulation of which may well be attributable to the abolishment 
of defensive measures—may be crucial.  Should Effissimo touch a 
nerve, it should not surprise if Japanese companies forced to choose 
between a politically costly and legally unreliable PRP or letting 
activist shareholders stream through open gates, were to conclude 
that the former is the lesser of two evils.  It is thus only a slight 
exaggeration to say that the fate of one of the most fascinating 
aspects of Japanese corporate governance may very well rest in the 
hands of a few persons based out of a mall on Singapore’s main 
shopping street.235 
Another recent and closely-watched development is the case of 
sōgō shōsha (general trading company) Itochu Corporation’s 
activities against the sportswear giant Descente Ltd., which had no 
PRP or other defensive measure in place.  A longtime major 
shareholder of Descente,236 on January 31, 2019, Itochu commenced 
an unsolicited tender offer with the target of raising its shareholding 
by 9.56%, from 30.44 to 40%.237  The offer price of JPY2, 800 yen a 
share amounted to a 50% premium over the average price in January 
2019.238  Interestingly, Itochu in its press release expressly declared 
 
June 2016 shareholder meeting, Effissimo has yet to table any shareholder proposals 
of its own, and suggesting that Effissimo may put forward its own proposal(s) for 
the next [i.e. 2019] shareholder meeting). 
 235 As of 2019, Effissimo appears to be based out of The Heeren, a shopping 
mall on Orchard Road in downtown Singapore. 
 236 See Itochū no Baishū Teian ni Taikō: Desanto ga Wakōru to Teikei (伊藤忠の買
収提案に対抗 デサントがワコールと提携) [Resisting Itochu’s Suggestion of an 
Acquisition, Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal] NIKKEI BUS. (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/report/15/110879/082900855/[https://perma.
cc/T3GF-RY3Q] [hereinafter Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal] (summarizing the 
history between Descente and Itochu, including changes in Itochu’s shareholding). 
 237 Itochu Corporation, Kabushiki-gaisha Desanto Kabushiki (Shōken Kōdo: 8114) 
ni Taisuru Kōkai Kaitsuke no Kaishi ni Kansuru Oshirase (株式会社デサント株式（証
券コード：8114）に対する公開買付けの開始に関するお知らせ) [Notice on the 
Commencement of Open Offer for Shares of Descente Ltd Shares (Securities Code: 8114)], 
15 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.itochu.co.jp/ja/ir/news/2019/__icsFiles/
afieldfile/2019/01/31/ITC190131_j.pdf [https://perma.cc/C84K-K9WB].  Note 
that Itochu—in collaboration with Descente’s second-largest shareholder—
controlled over a third of the shares, and thus already had the power to block 
fundamental changes, which under Japanese law requires a special resolution 
passed by a two-thirds majority.  See also Descente Enters Alliance with Wacoal, supra 
note 236, at 10 (reporting that Itochu had disclosed on Aug. 27, 2018 that it had 
raised its stake to 27.70%, and that there were rumors that Itochu and ANTA (which 
held just under 7% of Descente) were considering the possibility of a joint 
acquisition of Descente). 
 238 Itochu Corporation, supra note 237, at 13. 
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that it had no plans to acquire an outright majority and convert 
Descente into a subsidiary,239 despite media reports that the bid was 
prompted by a number of factors including:  Itochu’s dissatisfaction 
with what it perceived to be an excessive reliance by Descente on its 
South Korean business, Itochu’s interest in expanding operations in 
the People’s Republic of China, as well as Descente’s attempt to go 
private via leveraged management buyout.240 
Despite resistance from Descente’s president and most of the 
board,241 as well as the labor union and Descente alumni,242 Itochu’s 
hostile offer closed successfully on March 15, 2019.243  Negotiations 
between Itochu and Descente over restructuring of Descente’s board 
in February 2019 ultimately broke down.  On March 25, 2019, 
Descente announced that President Ishimoto Masatoshi (a third-
generation member of Descente’s founding family) will step down 
as of the shareholder meeting scheduled for June 2019, and will be 
 
 239 Id.  at 2-3.  Among Itochu’s reasons was that maintaining the independence 
of the target would facilitate its employees to display their "“excellent planning and 
development abilities” to the maximum possible extent.  Id. at 2.  
 240 Ōtsuka Takafumi & Nishimura Gōta, Desanto wo Meguru Baishūgeki, 
“Saishū Kecchaku” no Butai-ura: Kaichō Saisokkin wo Okurikomi, Zensekinin wo Ou 
Itochū (デサントを巡る買収劇､｢最終決着｣の舞台裏 会⻑最側近を送り込み､全責
任を負う伊藤忠) [Behind the Scenes of the “Final Settlement”:  Itochu Takes Full 
Responsibility by Sending in Chairman’s Top Aide], TŌYŌ KEIZAI ONLINE (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/273502 [https://perma.cc/E8RD-J59K] 
[hereinafter Ōtsuka & Nishimura]; Shuichiro Sese, Itochu-Descente feud escalates into 
full-blown takeover war, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-deals/Itochu-Descente-feud-
escalates-into-full-blown-takeover-war [https://perma.cc/FGR9-WEXF]; Desanto e 
no TOB, “MBO Teian Kikkake” Itochū Senmu (デサントへのTOB、「MBO提案きっ
かけ」 伊藤忠専務) [Itochu Senior Managing Director: Tender Offer for Descente 
“Sparked by Management Buyout Suggestion”], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO40716790R30C19A1TJ1000/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9TL-ULP8].  
 241 Descente Ltd, BS Inbesutomento Kabushiki Kaisha ni yoru Tōsha Kabuken ni 
Taisuru Kōkai Kaitsuke ni kansuru Iken Hyōmei (Hantai) no Oshirase (BSインベストメ
ント株式会社による当社株券に対する公開買付けに関する意見表明（反対）のお
知らせ) [Notice on Announcement of Adverse Opinion on the Open Offer for this 
Corporation’s Shares by BS Investment Corporation] (Feb. 7, 2019), 
http://www.descente.co.jp/jp/ir/190207_JP.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUY6-H7R9] 
(recommending against Itochu’s offer and noting that Shimizu Motonari, who is an 
Itochu nominee director, excused himself from the board meeting, and that 
Nakamura Ichirō, who was formerly of Itochu, “reserved his opinion”).  
 242 Ōtsuka & Nishimura, supra note 240.  
 243 Itochu Wins Bigger Stake in Sportswear-Maker Descente in Rare Hostile Takeover 
for Japan, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/03/15/business/corporate-business/itochu-wins-bigger-stake-
sportswear-maker-descente-rare-hostile-takeover-japan/ [https://perma.cc/7JLJ-
T9LA]. 
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replaced by Koseki Shūichi, head of Itochu’s textiles business and 
known top aide of Itochu chairman Okafuji Masahiro.244  Descente’s 
10-member board of directors will also be downsized to six, with 
two from Descente, two Itochu nominees, and two outside directors 
who are reputed business leaders with some connection to Itochu.245  
In successfully replacing most of Descente’s board, strengthening its 
representation on the board, and installing its own senior executive 
as Descente’s next president, Itochu’s victorious hostile action246 
opens another chapter in the annals of Japanese corporate 
governance. 
However, it must be stressed that even if there is a one-off 
successful takeover247—or further successful hostile action short of a 
full hostile takeover similar to the Itochu-Descente saga248—that 
sparks fear into the hearts of Japanese management, the “pill” will 
 
 244 Ōtsuka & Nishimura, supra note 240.  
 245 Id.  The incoming CFO, Tsuchihashi Akira, is an executive officer (shikkō-
yakuin) and the general manager of Itochu’s internal audit division.  Neither of the 
two remaining directors from Descente were lifetime employees who joined 
straight after graduation; one first joined Descente’s Korean operation, and the 
other is a former vice president of Adidas Japan. 
 246 Note that as Itochu (at 30.44% shareholding) already wielded a level of 
effective control even prior to the tender offer and did not seek to acquire an 
outright majority in Descente, Itochu’s actions do not fit our definition of hostile 
takeover.  For the definition, see supra note 129.  However, with the support of the 
second-largest shareholder, it is possible that Itochu now—with just 40%—may in 
practice control a majority of the voting power.  See Matsuzaki Yūsuke, “Hatsu” no 
Tekitai-teki TOB: Hikari to Kage (「初」の敵対的ＴＯＢ 光と影) [The “First” Hostile 
Tender Offer: Light and Darkness], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (morning ed.) (Mar. 19, 
2019), https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO42592240Y9A310C1DTA000/ 
[https://perma.cc/6AN7-ZKCN]. 
 247 For the definition, see supra note 129.   
 248 Another hostile action in Japan’s fast-moving scene to watch is the hostile 
bid for Kosaido Co., Ltd. by a fund led by the daughter of Murakami Yoshiaki 
launched on Mar. 22, 2019.  This bid is in response to a leveraged management 
buyout attempt by Kosaido’s founding family and management working in 
conjunction with Bain Capital.  See MBO Mezasu Kōsaidō e Kyū-Murakami Fando-kei 
“Reno” ga Taikō (MBO目指す廣済堂へ旧村上ファンド系「レノ」が対抗TOB) [Ex-
Murakami Fund-linked Reno Counters Kosaido’s MBO Attempt], M&A ONLINE (Mar. 
22, 2019), https://maonline.jp/articles/counter_tob_kosaido2019 
[https://perma.cc/Y3ZV-QH2K]; Japan Toys with Shareholder Capitalism Just as the 
West Balks, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.economist.com/
business/2019/03/30/japan-toys-with-shareholder-capitalism-just-as-the-west-
balks [https://perma.cc/W2QL-JUJF].  As of Apr. 9, 2019, the management buyout 
attempt has failed; the hostile bid remains pending.  Kōsaidō MBO Shūryō, Nokoru 
wa “Taikō TOB” no Yukue (廣済堂TOB終了、残るは「対抗TOB」の行方) [Kosaido’s 
MBO Attempt Over, What’s Left Is the “Counter TOB”], M&A ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://maonline.jp/articles/kosaido_tob_mbo201904 [https://perma.cc/4EYZ-
7X88]. 
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never take on American form unless Japanese courts introduce the 
active ingredient into PRPs:  the ability for the board to adopt a 
PRP—without shareholder approval—that provides the board with 
a clear veto right over a hostile bid.  If this were to occur, perhaps 
PRPs would be redesigned in the shadow of this jurisprudence—but 
that may take some time and right now seems a long way off.  Yet, 
only time will tell and we are loath to predict the future. 
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS INSPIRED BY JAPAN’S UNIQUE 
MEDICINE 
By stopping the hostile takeover wave in its tracks, poison pills 
won the takeover wars for management, and changed the trajectory 
of corporate governance in the U.S. by shifting power from 
shareholders to management by empowering boards.  The advent of 
hostile takeover attempts and indigenous versions of “poison pills” 
in Japan, long heralded as a prime candidate for a burgeoning 
hostile takeovers market, understandably raised expectations that 
Japan’s experience would track that of the U.S.  But this was not to 
be. 
As a medicine lacking the active ingredient in the U.S.-pill (i.e., 
providing the board with a veto right over a hostile bid) the Japanese 
“poison pill” is something entirely different than what exists in 
America.  We hope this Article has made this clear.  Perhaps more 
importantly, we hope that it provides an accurate understanding of 
Japanese defensive measures—especially the rise and fall of the 
PRP—on its own terms.  At a minimum, this Article should prevent 
those who read it from making the comparative corporate law error 
of simply classifying Japan with the U.S. as countries that have 
adopted the “poison pill.” 
Beyond this, there are at least three broader issues that we feel 
this exploration has raised that deserve more attention in future 
research.  First, this Article demonstrates the serious terminological 
problem in comparative law, which we feel may be getting worse in 
this era of burgeoning globalization where the lingua franca is 
increasingly English.  A common lexicon of English language 
corporate governance terms, which are mostly derived from the U.S. 
and U.K. experience, is increasingly used interchangeably by 
experts in jurisdictions around the world.  Although we see this as 
a positive phenomenon in that it promotes inter-jurisdictional 
discourse, this Article provides a cautionary tale about how in some 
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instances (and we have identified other instances elsewhere)249 it 
may terribly mislead. 
Second, this Article demonstrates how unique interpretations 
(or the lack thereof) of legal concepts by courts can transform the 
transplant of a legal idea from one jurisdiction, to something entirely 
different in another jurisdiction when it is implemented.  For a 
variety of reasons, the Delaware Court of Chancery is a unique 
animal—both within the U.S. and, especially, when compared to 
other courts outside the U.S.  The importance and uniqueness of 
Delaware’s judicial system in the development of U.S. corporate 
governance often seems to be forgotten when U.S. corporate law and 
governance concepts are exported abroad.  It is relatively easy to 
export a general idea—but incredibly difficult to transplant a system 
like the Delaware courts which has taken generations to develop 
and is constantly evolving. 
Third, it is often forgotten how much the timing of introducing 
a corporate governance mechanism may impact its development.  In 
this case, just when Japan’s poison pill was gaining some 
momentum, the Global Financial Crisis hit.  If not for this, who 
knows whether some hostile takeovers would have succeeded in 
Japan and the courts may have been forced to handle more cases and 
develop a jurisprudence similar to that of Delaware?  This is one 
more reason why functional convergence of corporate governance 
seems to be an academic pipe dream; whereas formal convergence—
at least at the high level of abstraction of simply transplanting 
common labels—is already here.  However, convergence of labels 
that misdescribe their contents not only provides scant intellectual 
leverage, but as we have seen in this case, can be terribly misleading.  
 
 249 Puchniak, supra note 101 (characterizing claims about how the derivative 
action would function based on legal origin or about the superiority of the common 
law as misleading); Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent 
Directors in Asia: A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, 
CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2017) 
(treating independent directors in Asia as equivalent in function to those in the U.S. 
is misleading, as is considering the rise of independent directors in Asia as evidence 
of convergence towards the Anglo-American model of corporate governance). 
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APPENDIX 
[Table 1] PRPs and other Defensive Measures in Japan, 2004–2018 
 
Source: RECOF Database250 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A
ct
iv
e 
de
fe
ns
e 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 
no
. o
f f
ir
m
s  Total 2 29 175 409 571 
PRPs 
(% total) 
0 
(0) 
20 
(68.97) 
163 
(93.14) 
398 
(97.31) 
562 
(98.42) 
Trust-type 0 5 9 9 7 
Others 2 4 3 2 2 
Change in PRPs, YoY 
(% change) 
N.A. 
N.A. 
20 
N.A. 
143 
(815) 
235 
(244.17) 
164 
(141.21) 
 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
A
ct
iv
e 
de
fe
ns
e 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 
no
. o
f 
fir
m
s 
Total 565 540 521 514 511 
PRPs 
(% total) 
561 
(99.29) 
536 
(99.26) 
517 
(99.23) 
510 
(99.22) 
507 
(99.22) 
Trust-type 2 2 2 2 2 
Others 2 2 2 2 2 
Change in PRPs, YoY 
(% change) 
-1 
(-.00178) 
-25 
(-4.46) 
-19 
(-3.54) 
-7 
(-1.35) 
-3 
(-0.588) 
 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
A
ct
iv
e 
de
fe
ns
e 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 
no
. o
f 
fir
m
s 
Total 495 478 448 409 387 
PRPs  
(% total) 
490 
(98.99) 
473 
(98.95) 
443 
(98.88) 
405 
(99.02) 
383 
(98.97) 
Trust-type 2 2 2 2 2 
Others 3 3 3 2 2 
Change in PRPs, YoY  
(% change) 
-17 
(-3.35) 
-17 
(-3.47) 
-30 
(-6.34) 
-38 
(-8.58) 
-22 
(-5.43) 
 
Figures for 2004–2008 and 2010–2017 are as of 31 December each 
year; for 2018, 31 October. Figures for 2009 are extrapolated. 
  
 
 250 Data for 2004–2008 is from the MARR RECOF Database as reported in 
M&A Kenkyūkai Hōkoku 2009 (M&A研究会報告2009) [Reports of the M&A Study 
Group, 2009] (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government 
of Japan) 10 fig. 1-13 (Feb. 2009), [https://perma.cc/8E5J-9S5V] (prepared by Niwa 
Shōichi, executive officer of RECOF Corporation).  Data for 2010–2018 is from 
MARR RECOF Database, M&A Tōkei (Hyō to Gurafu) (M&A統計（表とグラフ）) 
[M&A Statistics: Tables and Graphs] 32 (Dec. 2018). 
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[Table 2] Trends in Defensive Measures in Corporate Japan, 2008–2018251 
 
Source: compiled from Sumitomo Trust Bank reports in Shōji Hōmu, 
2006–2018 (excluding 2014).252 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Cos. w/ active measures 570 567 542 521 514 512 
As % of all listed N.A. N.A. 14.7 14.5 14.5 14.5 
New measures adopted, 
previous 12 months 207 21 4 6 6 9 
Measures introduced 
(cumulative) 588* 609 613 619 625 634 
Measures abolished, 
previous 12 months 10 24 29 27 13 11 
Measures abolished 
(cumulative) 16* 42 71 98 111 122 
Measures expiring, 
previous 12 months N.A. 167 227 285 145 194 
Attrition, previous 12 
months253 N.A. 15 21 24 12 7 
Attrition rate, previous 
12 months (%) N.A. 8.98 9.25 8.42 8.28 3.61 
 
  
 
 251 Single asterisks indicate extrapolated figures; double asterisks indicate 
figures corrected based on studies published in later years; single crosses indicate 
figures from or computed based on unpublished data.  Each 12-month period for 
each reference year runs from Aug. 1 of the previous year to July 31. 
 252 For full citations to the studies, see supra note 154.  No study was published 
by SMTB analysts in 2014, but unpublished data on the number of expiring 
measures and the number subject to attrition for reference year 2014 was sourced 
from Mogi Miki and Tanino Kōji of SMTB and the attrition rate figure for 2014 
calculated accordingly.  Although every effort at compiling a consistent dataset has 
been made, any remaining inconsistencies are an artifact of the original data and 
reproduced accordingly; they do not, however, have a material impact on the data.  
Where figures from studies published in different years conflict, the later (or latest) 
study prevails. 
 253 Defined as number of defensive measures discontinued out of those due to 
expire within a reference year. 
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Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Cos. w/ active measures 494 479 453 408 386 
As % of all listed N.A. 13.4 12.5 11.2** 10.4 
New measures adopted, 
previous 12 months 5 8 6 3 5 
Measures introduced 
(cumulative) 639* 647 653 656 661 
Measures abolished, 
previous 12 months 23 23 32 48 27 
Measures abolished 
(cumulative) 145* 168 200 248 275 
Measures expiring, 
previous 12 months 239
† 138 171 213 115 
Attrition, previous 12 
months254 23
† 18 29 44 26 
Attrition rate, previous 
12 months (%) 9.62
† 13.04 16.96 20.66 22.60 
 
  
 
 254 Defined as number of defensive measures discontinued out of those due to 
expire within a reference year. 
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[Table 3] Abolished Defensive Measures: Trends and Reasons, 2006–
2018255 
 
Source: RECOF Database.256  
 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Cumulative abolishments 105* 122* 133* 157* 
Abolishments each calendar year 25 17 11 24 
Abolishment 
initiated by 
management 
Non-renewal 74* 5 7 17 
Before expiry 4* 5 0 0 
Other reasons 3* 0 1 0 
Non-
management 
side reasons 
Failure to obtain 
shareholder 
support 
0* 0 0 1 
Delisting/merger 19* 7 3 6 
Injunction/winding 
up 5* 0 0 0 
 
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Cumulative abolishments 180* 216* 259* 286* 
Abolishments each calendar year 23 36 43 27 
Abolishment 
initiated by 
management 
Non-renewal 19 29 41 24 
Before expiry 3 1 1 2 
Other reasons 0 1 0 0 
Non-
management 
side reasons 
Failure to obtain 
shareholder 
support 
0 0 0 0 
Delisting/merger 1 5 1 1 
Injunction/winding 
up 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 255 Asterisks indicate cumulative figures up to that year.  Figures for 2011–
2017 are as of Dec. 31 of each year; for 2018, as of Oct. 31. 
 256 MARR, supra note 250, at 33.  
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